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Modal Realism and the Possibility of Island Universes: Why There are no Possible Worlds 模态现实主义和岛屿宇宙的可能性:为什么不存在可能世界
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-11-03 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0027
Jiri Benovsky
Abstract In this article, I defend Lewisian modal realism against objections arising from the possibility of ‘Island Universes’ and other similar cases. The problem comes from Lewis’ claim that possible worlds are spatio-temporally isolated. I suggest a modification of Lewisian modal realism in order to avoid this family of objections. This modification may sound quite radical since it amounts to abandoning the very notion of a possible world, but as radical as it may sound it in fact remains well in the spirit of Lewis’ original view.
在这篇文章中,我为刘易斯模态现实主义辩护,反对“岛屿宇宙”和其他类似案例的可能性所引起的反对意见。这个问题来自刘易斯的主张,即可能世界在时空上是孤立的。我建议对刘易斯模态实在论进行修改,以避免这一系列反对意见。这种修改可能听起来很激进,因为它等于放弃了一个可能世界的概念,但实际上,尽管听起来很激进,但它仍然很好地保留了刘易斯最初观点的精神。
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引用次数: 0
Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay 过着双重生活:雕像和粘土碎片
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/MP-2020-0018
J. Biro
Abstract Some philosophers think that two distinct things can occupy exactly the same region of space, as with a statue and a piece of clay. Others think that the statue and the piece of clay are identical, but not necessarily so. I argue that Alan Gibbard’s well-known story of Goliath and Lumpl does not support either of these claims. Not the first, as there is independent reason to think that it cannot be true. Not the second, because there is no need to invoke the dubiously intelligible notion of contingent identity to account for the facts of the story.
摘要一些哲学家认为,两种截然不同的东西可以占据完全相同的空间区域,就像一尊雕像和一块粘土一样。其他人认为雕像和这块粘土是一样的,但不一定如此。我认为艾伦·吉巴德关于歌利亚和卢姆普的著名故事并不支持这两种说法。不是第一个,因为有独立的理由认为这不可能是真的。不是第二个,因为没有必要援引可理解的偶然身份概念来解释故事的事实。
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引用次数: 0
Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory 超越同一性理论的强大品质
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/MP-2020-0002
Vassilis Livanios
Abstract Until recently, the powerful qualities view about properties has been effectively identified with the so-called identity theory. Yet, the difficulties that the latter faces (especially concerning the interpretation of its core claim that dispositionality and qualitativity are identical) have led some metaphysicians to propose (at least provisionally) new versions of the powerful qualities view. This paper discusses the prospects of three such versions: the compound view, the higher-order properties theory and the dual aspect account. It is argued that the compound view is in fact property dualism in disguise, while the higher-order properties theory does not by itself provide a metaphysically convincing solution to Armstrong’s dilemma concerning the modal status of the relation between dispositionality and categoricality. Finally, it is argued that it is not clear whether the dual aspect account is distinct from identity theory and pure powerism.
直到最近,关于属性的强大品质观一直被有效地与所谓的同一性理论等同起来。然而,后者面临的困难(特别是关于其核心主张的解释,即性格和质性是相同的)导致一些形而上学家提出(至少暂时地)新的版本的强大的品质观点。本文讨论了复合观点、高阶性质理论和对偶方面说这三种观点的发展前景。复合观点实际上是变相的性质二元论,而高阶性质理论本身并不能从形而上学上令人信服地解决阿姆斯特朗关于性与直言性关系的模态地位的困境。最后,本文认为,双重方面说是否与身份理论和纯粹的权力主义有区别尚不清楚。
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引用次数: 5
Frontmatter Frontmatter
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-frontmatter2
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引用次数: 0
No Good Arguments for Causal Closure 因果关系结束没有好的论据
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/MP-2019-0026
Keith Buhler
Abstract Many common arguments for physicalism begin with the principle that the cosmos is “causally closed.” But how good are the arguments for causal closure itself? I argue that the deductive, a priori arguments on behalf of causal closure tend to beg the question. The extant inductive arguments fare no better. They commit a sampling error or a non-sequitur, or else offer conclusions that remain compatible with causal openness. In short, we have no good arguments that the physical world is causally closed.
摘要物理主义的许多常见论点都是从宇宙“因果闭合”的原理开始的。但因果闭合本身的论点有多好?我认为,代表因果闭合的演绎、先验论点往往会引出这个问题。现存的归纳论点也好不到哪里去。他们犯了抽样错误或不合理的推论,或者提供了与因果开放性保持一致的结论。简言之,我们没有很好的论据来证明物理世界是因果封闭的。
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引用次数: 1
Actualistic Foundation of Possibilism 可能性论的现实基础
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-08-25 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-0021
S. Galvan
Abstract In this article I defend a form of classical possibilism with an actualist foundation. As a matter of fact, I believe that this position is more in keeping with the classical metaphysical tradition. According to this form of possibilism, I construe possible objects as possible non-existing objects of an existing producing power. Consequently, they are nothing vis-à -vis the modality of their own actual being, although they do exist with regard to the modality of the producing power’s being. The actualist requirement prescribed by the Frege-Quinean criterion of the quantification domain is thus fulfilled; indeed, really possible objects are not actual objects, but their possibility is actual.
摘要在这篇文章中,我为一种具有现实主义基础的古典可能性主义形式辩护。事实上,我认为这种立场更符合古典形而上学的传统。根据这种可能性的形式,我将可能的对象理解为现有生产能力的可能的不存在的对象。因此,它们与自身实际存在的形态无关,尽管它们确实与生产国的存在形态有关。从而满足了量化域的Frege-Quinean准则所规定的实际要求;事实上,真正可能的对象不是实际的对象,但它们的可能性是实际的。
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引用次数: 0
Semantic Realism, Actually 语义实在论
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-08-18 DOI: 10.1515/MP-2019-0025
S. Hewitt
Abstract Michael Dummett offered a semantic characterisation of a variety of realism-antirealism debates. This approach has fallen out of fashion. This has been to the detriment of metaphysics. This paper offers an accurate characterisation of Dummett’s view, often lacking in the literature, and then defends it against a range of attacks (from Devitt, Miller and Williamson). This understanding of realism debates is resilient, and if we take it seriously the philosophical terrain looks importantly different. In particular, the philosophy of language has a foundational role with respect to metaphysics.
摘要Michael Dummett对各种现实主义反现实主义辩论进行了语义表征。这种方法已经过时了。这对形而上学是有害的。本文对Dummett的观点进行了准确的描述,这在文献中经常缺乏,然后为其辩护,以抵御一系列攻击(来自Devitt、Miller和Williamson)。这种对现实主义辩论的理解是有弹性的,如果我们认真对待它,哲学领域看起来会有很大的不同。特别是,语言哲学在形而上学方面具有基础性的作用。
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引用次数: 0
Hylomorphism and Complex Properties 同形性与复性
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-04-03 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0003
Graham Renz
Abstract Hylomorphism is the Aristotelian theory according to which objects are composites of form and matter. Form is what unifies the various parts of an object – the matter – into a cohesive whole. Some contemporary hylomorphists argue their theory applies beyond the realm of concreta, and that it explains the unity of various abstract entities. Not everyone agrees. Recent criticism alleges that hylomorphism fails to explain the unity of certain abstract entities, namely, complex properties – properties with other properties as proper parts. Here, I both respond to this criticism and show that and how hylomorphism extends to the domain of complex properties. By discussing hylomorphism’s applicability to the hitherto unchartered domain of complex properties, I hope to defend its credentials as a general mereological theory.
Hylomorphism是亚里士多德的理论,根据该理论,物体是形式和物质的复合物。形式是将物体的各个部分——物质——统一为一个有凝聚力的整体。一些当代亚纯论者认为,他们的理论超越了concreta的范畴,它解释了各种抽象实体的统一性。并非所有人都同意。最近的批评声称,亚纯性无法解释某些抽象实体的统一性,即复杂性质——与其他性质作为适当部分的性质。在这里,我既回应了这种批评,也展示了亚纯性是如何延伸到复杂性质的领域的。通过讨论亚纯性对迄今为止未知的复杂性质领域的适用性,我希望捍卫它作为一个一般的表面论理论的资格。
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引用次数: 1
Malebranche on Intelligible Extension: A Programmatic Interpretation Malebranche关于智能扩展的程序解释
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-04-03 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0005
A. D. Bassford
Abstract The purpose of this essay is exegesis. I explicate Nicholas Malebranche’s concept of intelligible extension. I begin by detailing how the concept matured throughout Malebranche’s work, and the new functions it took on within his metaphysical system. I then examine Gustav Bergmann’s (1956. “Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Malebranche.” The Review of Metaphysics 10(2): 207–26) “axiomatic” interpretation, as well as the criticism of it offered by Daise Radner (1994. “Malebranche and the Individuation of Perceptual Objects.” In Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Kenneth F. Barber, and Jorge J. E. Gracia, New York: SUNY Press). I argue that Radner’s criticism of the interpretation is only partly successful; some of her objections can be met; others cannot. I then develop a novel interpretation of the concept, given insights from this dispute. I call it the “programmatic interpretation.” I argue that this interpretation coheres well with Malebranche’s famous Vision in God thesis, as well as many of his other commitments. I conclude by considering a certain pertinent objection to my proposal, summarizing the dialectic, and forcefully restating my case.
摘要本文的目的是注释。我阐述了尼古拉斯·马莱布兰奇的可懂外延概念。我首先详细介绍了这个概念是如何在马莱布兰奇的整个作品中成熟的,以及它在他的形而上学体系中承担的新功能。然后,我研究了古斯塔夫·伯格曼(1956年。“关于Malebranche哲学的一些评论”,《形而上学评论》10(2):207–26)“公理化”解释,以及Daise Radner(1994)对其提出的批评。“Malebranche与感知对象的个体化”,载于《早期现代哲学中的个体化与身份认同》,Kenneth F.Barber和Jorge J.E.Gracia主编,纽约:纽约州立大学出版社)。我认为拉德纳对这种解释的批评只是部分成功;她的一些反对意见可以得到满足;其他人不能。然后,我对这一概念进行了新颖的解释,并从这场争论中获得了见解。我称之为“程序性解释”。我认为这种解释与Malebranche著名的《上帝的愿景》论文以及他的许多其他承诺非常一致。最后,我考虑了对我的建议的一些相关反对意见,总结了辩证法,并有力地重申了我的观点。
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引用次数: 2
Frontmatter
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-frontmatter1
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics
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