Abstract In this article, I defend Lewisian modal realism against objections arising from the possibility of ‘Island Universes’ and other similar cases. The problem comes from Lewis’ claim that possible worlds are spatio-temporally isolated. I suggest a modification of Lewisian modal realism in order to avoid this family of objections. This modification may sound quite radical since it amounts to abandoning the very notion of a possible world, but as radical as it may sound it in fact remains well in the spirit of Lewis’ original view.
{"title":"Modal Realism and the Possibility of Island Universes: Why There are no Possible Worlds","authors":"Jiri Benovsky","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, I defend Lewisian modal realism against objections arising from the possibility of ‘Island Universes’ and other similar cases. The problem comes from Lewis’ claim that possible worlds are spatio-temporally isolated. I suggest a modification of Lewisian modal realism in order to avoid this family of objections. This modification may sound quite radical since it amounts to abandoning the very notion of a possible world, but as radical as it may sound it in fact remains well in the spirit of Lewis’ original view.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-0027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46277400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Some philosophers think that two distinct things can occupy exactly the same region of space, as with a statue and a piece of clay. Others think that the statue and the piece of clay are identical, but not necessarily so. I argue that Alan Gibbard’s well-known story of Goliath and Lumpl does not support either of these claims. Not the first, as there is independent reason to think that it cannot be true. Not the second, because there is no need to invoke the dubiously intelligible notion of contingent identity to account for the facts of the story.
{"title":"Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay","authors":"J. Biro","doi":"10.1515/MP-2020-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/MP-2020-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Some philosophers think that two distinct things can occupy exactly the same region of space, as with a statue and a piece of clay. Others think that the statue and the piece of clay are identical, but not necessarily so. I argue that Alan Gibbard’s well-known story of Goliath and Lumpl does not support either of these claims. Not the first, as there is independent reason to think that it cannot be true. Not the second, because there is no need to invoke the dubiously intelligible notion of contingent identity to account for the facts of the story.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/MP-2020-0018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42313136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Until recently, the powerful qualities view about properties has been effectively identified with the so-called identity theory. Yet, the difficulties that the latter faces (especially concerning the interpretation of its core claim that dispositionality and qualitativity are identical) have led some metaphysicians to propose (at least provisionally) new versions of the powerful qualities view. This paper discusses the prospects of three such versions: the compound view, the higher-order properties theory and the dual aspect account. It is argued that the compound view is in fact property dualism in disguise, while the higher-order properties theory does not by itself provide a metaphysically convincing solution to Armstrong’s dilemma concerning the modal status of the relation between dispositionality and categoricality. Finally, it is argued that it is not clear whether the dual aspect account is distinct from identity theory and pure powerism.
{"title":"Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory","authors":"Vassilis Livanios","doi":"10.1515/MP-2020-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/MP-2020-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Until recently, the powerful qualities view about properties has been effectively identified with the so-called identity theory. Yet, the difficulties that the latter faces (especially concerning the interpretation of its core claim that dispositionality and qualitativity are identical) have led some metaphysicians to propose (at least provisionally) new versions of the powerful qualities view. This paper discusses the prospects of three such versions: the compound view, the higher-order properties theory and the dual aspect account. It is argued that the compound view is in fact property dualism in disguise, while the higher-order properties theory does not by itself provide a metaphysically convincing solution to Armstrong’s dilemma concerning the modal status of the relation between dispositionality and categoricality. Finally, it is argued that it is not clear whether the dual aspect account is distinct from identity theory and pure powerism.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/MP-2020-0002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44320402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Many common arguments for physicalism begin with the principle that the cosmos is “causally closed.” But how good are the arguments for causal closure itself? I argue that the deductive, a priori arguments on behalf of causal closure tend to beg the question. The extant inductive arguments fare no better. They commit a sampling error or a non-sequitur, or else offer conclusions that remain compatible with causal openness. In short, we have no good arguments that the physical world is causally closed.
{"title":"No Good Arguments for Causal Closure","authors":"Keith Buhler","doi":"10.1515/MP-2019-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/MP-2019-0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many common arguments for physicalism begin with the principle that the cosmos is “causally closed.” But how good are the arguments for causal closure itself? I argue that the deductive, a priori arguments on behalf of causal closure tend to beg the question. The extant inductive arguments fare no better. They commit a sampling error or a non-sequitur, or else offer conclusions that remain compatible with causal openness. In short, we have no good arguments that the physical world is causally closed.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/MP-2019-0026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47187282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this article I defend a form of classical possibilism with an actualist foundation. As a matter of fact, I believe that this position is more in keeping with the classical metaphysical tradition. According to this form of possibilism, I construe possible objects as possible non-existing objects of an existing producing power. Consequently, they are nothing vis-à -vis the modality of their own actual being, although they do exist with regard to the modality of the producing power’s being. The actualist requirement prescribed by the Frege-Quinean criterion of the quantification domain is thus fulfilled; indeed, really possible objects are not actual objects, but their possibility is actual.
{"title":"Actualistic Foundation of Possibilism","authors":"S. Galvan","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article I defend a form of classical possibilism with an actualist foundation. As a matter of fact, I believe that this position is more in keeping with the classical metaphysical tradition. According to this form of possibilism, I construe possible objects as possible non-existing objects of an existing producing power. Consequently, they are nothing vis-à -vis the modality of their own actual being, although they do exist with regard to the modality of the producing power’s being. The actualist requirement prescribed by the Frege-Quinean criterion of the quantification domain is thus fulfilled; indeed, really possible objects are not actual objects, but their possibility is actual.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48175160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Michael Dummett offered a semantic characterisation of a variety of realism-antirealism debates. This approach has fallen out of fashion. This has been to the detriment of metaphysics. This paper offers an accurate characterisation of Dummett’s view, often lacking in the literature, and then defends it against a range of attacks (from Devitt, Miller and Williamson). This understanding of realism debates is resilient, and if we take it seriously the philosophical terrain looks importantly different. In particular, the philosophy of language has a foundational role with respect to metaphysics.
{"title":"Semantic Realism, Actually","authors":"S. Hewitt","doi":"10.1515/MP-2019-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/MP-2019-0025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Michael Dummett offered a semantic characterisation of a variety of realism-antirealism debates. This approach has fallen out of fashion. This has been to the detriment of metaphysics. This paper offers an accurate characterisation of Dummett’s view, often lacking in the literature, and then defends it against a range of attacks (from Devitt, Miller and Williamson). This understanding of realism debates is resilient, and if we take it seriously the philosophical terrain looks importantly different. In particular, the philosophy of language has a foundational role with respect to metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/MP-2019-0025","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44759185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Hylomorphism is the Aristotelian theory according to which objects are composites of form and matter. Form is what unifies the various parts of an object – the matter – into a cohesive whole. Some contemporary hylomorphists argue their theory applies beyond the realm of concreta, and that it explains the unity of various abstract entities. Not everyone agrees. Recent criticism alleges that hylomorphism fails to explain the unity of certain abstract entities, namely, complex properties – properties with other properties as proper parts. Here, I both respond to this criticism and show that and how hylomorphism extends to the domain of complex properties. By discussing hylomorphism’s applicability to the hitherto unchartered domain of complex properties, I hope to defend its credentials as a general mereological theory.
{"title":"Hylomorphism and Complex Properties","authors":"Graham Renz","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hylomorphism is the Aristotelian theory according to which objects are composites of form and matter. Form is what unifies the various parts of an object – the matter – into a cohesive whole. Some contemporary hylomorphists argue their theory applies beyond the realm of concreta, and that it explains the unity of various abstract entities. Not everyone agrees. Recent criticism alleges that hylomorphism fails to explain the unity of certain abstract entities, namely, complex properties – properties with other properties as proper parts. Here, I both respond to this criticism and show that and how hylomorphism extends to the domain of complex properties. By discussing hylomorphism’s applicability to the hitherto unchartered domain of complex properties, I hope to defend its credentials as a general mereological theory.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-0003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42161196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The purpose of this essay is exegesis. I explicate Nicholas Malebranche’s concept of intelligible extension. I begin by detailing how the concept matured throughout Malebranche’s work, and the new functions it took on within his metaphysical system. I then examine Gustav Bergmann’s (1956. “Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Malebranche.” The Review of Metaphysics 10(2): 207–26) “axiomatic” interpretation, as well as the criticism of it offered by Daise Radner (1994. “Malebranche and the Individuation of Perceptual Objects.” In Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Kenneth F. Barber, and Jorge J. E. Gracia, New York: SUNY Press). I argue that Radner’s criticism of the interpretation is only partly successful; some of her objections can be met; others cannot. I then develop a novel interpretation of the concept, given insights from this dispute. I call it the “programmatic interpretation.” I argue that this interpretation coheres well with Malebranche’s famous Vision in God thesis, as well as many of his other commitments. I conclude by considering a certain pertinent objection to my proposal, summarizing the dialectic, and forcefully restating my case.
{"title":"Malebranche on Intelligible Extension: A Programmatic Interpretation","authors":"A. D. Bassford","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The purpose of this essay is exegesis. I explicate Nicholas Malebranche’s concept of intelligible extension. I begin by detailing how the concept matured throughout Malebranche’s work, and the new functions it took on within his metaphysical system. I then examine Gustav Bergmann’s (1956. “Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Malebranche.” The Review of Metaphysics 10(2): 207–26) “axiomatic” interpretation, as well as the criticism of it offered by Daise Radner (1994. “Malebranche and the Individuation of Perceptual Objects.” In Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Kenneth F. Barber, and Jorge J. E. Gracia, New York: SUNY Press). I argue that Radner’s criticism of the interpretation is only partly successful; some of her objections can be met; others cannot. I then develop a novel interpretation of the concept, given insights from this dispute. I call it the “programmatic interpretation.” I argue that this interpretation coheres well with Malebranche’s famous Vision in God thesis, as well as many of his other commitments. I conclude by considering a certain pertinent objection to my proposal, summarizing the dialectic, and forcefully restating my case.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-0005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49106747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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