Journal of Experimental Social Psychology最新文献

Navigating the social world requires individuals to balance multiple goals, including the drives to improve one's own outcomes, aid ingroup members, and help or hurt outgroup members. While self-interest and intergroup bias are both well-established motivational phenomena, less is known about how these goals may interact. Here we examine the nature of goal tradeoffs in intergroup decision-making using a novel task in which participants simultaneously make monetary decisions for themselves, an arbitrary ingroup, and the corresponding outgroup. Across four behavioural studies and one eye-tracking study (total N = 704), we find that goals in intergroup contexts are pursued sequentially rather than concurrently, with non-linear upweighting of group-related goals when self-related goals cannot be pursued. Further, we find evidence for stronger self-ingroup than self-outgroup tradeoffs, which manifest in both altered attention to information and altered use of the attended information in decision-making. The results shed light on the cognitive structuring of interrelated goals in intergroup decision-making, furthering our understanding of when and how both intergroup biases and prosocial behaviour may emerge.

People typically remember faces of their own race better than the faces of other races, which is known as the own-race bias. Social-cognitive theories on the own-race bias debate if motivation plays a role in racial face recognition under the “Asian-Caucasian” context. We investigated the effect of social-identity-threat based motivation on own-race bias. In Experiment 1, Chinese participants were primed with a negative image of own-race by associating Chinese (i.e., own-race) faces with negative personality traits. Results showed that such social identity threat marginally affect the own-race bias in face recognition sensitivity (Experiment 1a), and it did not influence participants' implicit positive attitudes toward their ethnicity (Experiment 1b). In Experiments 2, 3 and 4, the social identity threat was manipulated by reading an article before the face recognition task. Experiment 2 found that the social identity threat significantly affected the own-race bias in face recognition false alarm. Although we did not find the modulation effect of group on ORB with ANOVA in Experiments 3 and 4, we observed the significant indirect effect of group on ORB through the mediator of generalized threat. Together, the current study provides evidence of social motivation in the own-race bias in the “Asian-Caucasian” setting.

In the pursuit of happiness, how does an individual's standing in each of their groups affect their well-being? In ten pre-registered studies of 3554 participants, I found that attaining a greater number of high-status positions increased well-being but only in select groups. In surveys of workers (Studies 1, S1 and S2) and student athletes (Study S3), well-being was significantly positively related to the number and proportion of high-status positions a person held in their important groups, i.e., those groups central to their identity, but was not related to the status they held in their unimportant groups, regardless of how status was measured. Holding high-status in important groups increased well-being because such positions bolstered individuals' self-esteem and increased their sense of acceptance in those groups but not because such positions enhanced their sense of power. Four experiments (Studies 2, S5, S6, and S7) utilizing random assignment and a year-long longitudinal study (Study 3) established the causal relationship between well-being and high-status across groups as well as the moderating role of the groups' importance. A field study of graduate students (Study S4) utilizing a round-robin design confirmed that well-being was positively related to graduate students' self-reported status as well as the status ratings they received from their peers in an important group but not in an unimportant group. Therefore, in the pursuit of happiness, individuals would be wise to focus their energy on attaining and maintaining high-status only in those important groups that are central to their identity.

Financial scarcity, both real and imagined, is associated with impaired executive functions and present-focused economic decisions. What is the mechanism that connects the lack of financial resources to these cognitive and behavioral effects? The present work will test the hypothesis that the experience of financial stress contributes to these deficits by reducing executive functions related to self-control and causing present-focused, real-world economic decisions. In a preliminary experiment (N = 215), we found support for the hypothesis that financial stress (as compared to social stress) causes a reduction in inhibitory control performance. In the registered study, we recruited participants (N = 1014) from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds and assessed inhibitory control before and after a financial stress manipulation, and economic preferences. The results did not support the hypothesis that momentary financial stress reduces inhibitory control or alters time preference. However, chronic financial stress was associated with reduced inhibitory control and VWM, and real-world economic decisions. Several interactions between SES and the effect of conditions highlight the relevance of a person's SES in the association between affective experiences and cognitive and behavioral responses. We discuss the implications of this work for future study of the association between SES, executive function, and economic decisions.

People have the automatic tendency to mimic their interaction partners. Mimicry theories propose that such mimicking behavior is beneficial for the mimicker as mimicked persons tend to like, trust and help the mimicker more. Yet an open question remains as to whether prosocial effects translate to parties other than the mimicker. To test for the presence of such a spillover effect, we ran two field experiments (total N = 460). In all experiments, participants interacted with an experimenter. The experimenter either verbally mimicked the participants or behaved naturally. Afterwards, either the experimenter or another person asked participants to donate to a charity. Across all experiments, our results indicate that irrespective of whether a donation request is made by the mimicker or another person, mimicry increases the likelihood to donate to a charity, but not the amount that participants are willing to donate. Bayesian analyses suggest that this effect is less strongly pronounced than assumed by previous research and theories.

Studies support an association between religious belief and prosocial behavior. Such religious prosociality has been attributed to fear of supernatural punishment and enhanced concern for a prosocial reputation and self-image. Hence, religious individuals may be more prone to pursue their self-interest indirectly, thereby averting personal responsibility. We conducted 12 studies (N_total = 4468) to examine whether religiosity predicts delegation in incentivized deception, dictator, and die-roll cheating games and in realistic scenarios. Participants could choose between an immoral (e.g., lying) and a moral, prosocial (e.g., honest/fair) option or leave this decision to another individual (the agent) who equally benefited from the immoral option. Across all studies, religiosity positively predicted delegation, even though participants could directly implement prosocial outcomes. Employing experimental manipulations of participants' interests, we found that the predictive effect of religiosity on delegation only emerged when participants could expect to benefit from the agent's decision, but not when they were not affected by it or could be harmed by it. At the same time, religiosity predicted prosocial decisions among non-delegating participants. Moreover, delegating participants felt less bad and responsible about their decisions and victims' outcomes. Taken together, these findings suggest that delegation is strategically employed by individuals who would otherwise act prosocially to pursue selfish interests while avoiding responsibility and blame. They further support the notion of religious prosociality as a multi-faceted, context-dependent phenomenon.

If you are trying to persuade someone, expressing your opinion with certainty intuitively seems like a good strategy to maximize your influence. However, Karmarkar and Tormala (2010) found that the effectiveness of this tactic depends on expertise. In three experiments, Karmarkar and Tormala found support for an incongruity hypothesis, whereby non-expert sources can gain interest and influence by expressing certainty, while expert sources can increase persuasion by expressing uncertainty. In this Registered Report, we conducted a high-powered (N = 1018) direct replication of Experiment 2 by Karmarkar and Tormala (2010). In a consumer behaviour context, the original study examined whether source expertise moderated the positive effect of source certainty on the persuasive impact of a restaurant recommendation. The present replication failed to find support for the incongruity hypothesis, η_p² = 0.00 [0.00, 0.02]: expressing certainty had a positive but non-significant effect for non-experts, d = 0.10 [−0.10, 0.34], and a positive effect for experts, d = 0.28 [0.03, 0.52]. Instead, the results supported the competing confidence heuristic hypothesis that expressed certainty would have a positive effect on persuasion, irrespective of source expertise, d = 0.18 [0.01, 0.36]. Extending the original work, we (1) controlled for the reason given for (un)certainty, and (2) examined need for closure as a potential individual difference moderator. The results indicated robust support for the confidence heuristic d = 0.25, [0.12, 0.37], but neither reason for (un)certainty nor need for closure moderated the effect as hypothesized. All materials, data, and code are available on: https://osf.io/hbjyv/.

The bounded generalized reciprocity (BGR) model, grounded in reputation management, predicts that the motivation underlying ingroup favoritism (favoring one's own group over other groups) is driven by avoiding a negative reputation within one's own group. This research conducted two economic games with minimal groups in which reputational concerns (partners' knowledge of participants' group membership) were manipulated. We aimed to verify the replicability of the experimental results in support of the BGR model. A study (N = 394) using a dictator game (in which participants unilaterally determined their partners' payoffs) indicated the following: (1) participants were more likely to behave cooperatively with ingroup partners than with outgroup partners, regardless of whether their partners knew the participants' group membership; and (2) individual differences in fear of negative evaluation by others were not associated with cooperation toward the ingroup. Similar results were found in another study (N = 429) using a prisoner's dilemma game (in which participants' payoffs were determined by their partners). However, while sharing knowledge about group membership facilitated cooperation with the outgroup in the dictator game, no such tendency was observed in the prisoner's dilemma game. These findings suggest that concerns about a bad reputation may not play a relatively important role in ingroup favoritism, and that generosity toward outgroup members is influenced by the presence or absence of interdependence (i.e., whether the partner's behavior affects the participant's payoffs). This research proposes a reconsideration of the motivations behind cooperation within or between groups.

To restore their reputation, people from honor cultures (e.g., U.S. South) are more likely than people from dignity cultures (e.g., U.S. North) to retaliate against conflict partners who insult them. If a conflict partner does not insult them, however, they are more polite than dignity culture individuals, so that they don't provoke the person unnecessarily. Previous research has not examined the implicit person perception phase in these interactions. In this research, we focused on spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) that people can make from others' potentially offensive behaviors. In four studies (n = 1126), we tested whether being from a U.S. honor or dignity culture or the endorsement of these values was associated with hostile and nonhostile STIs, and whether honor and dignity influenced the relationship between STIs and behavioral intentions. In Study 1 and 2, honor culture participants made both types of STIs, whereas dignity culture participants only made hostile STIs. Study 3 revealed a positive association between individual honor endorsement and nonhostile STIs. In Study 4, we replicated most of these results and also found a positive association between hostile STIs and confrontation intentions in the honor (but not dignity) group. These results suggest that people from honor (vs. dignity) cultures tend to make rather simultaneous inferences of hostile and nonhostile traits from potentially offensive behaviors and making spontaneous hostile inferences can be more consequential for them. This research highlights the complexity of culture's influence on interpersonal processes and can have implications for diverse social contexts.

Moral judgments are increasingly being understood as showing context dependent variability. A growing literature has identified a range of specific contextual factors (e.g., emotions, intentions) that can influence moral judgments in predictable ways. Integrating these diverse influences into a unified approach to understanding moral judgments remains a challenge. Recent work by Railton (2017) attempted to address this with a causal-evaluative modelling approach to moral judgment. In support of this model Railton presents evidence from novel variations of classic trolley type dilemmas. We present results from a pre-registered pilot study that highlight a significant confound and demonstrate that it likely influenced Railton's results. Building on this, our registered report presents a replication-extension of Railton's study, using larger more diverse samples, and more rigorous methods and materials, specifically controlling for potential confounds. We found that participants' judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are influenced by both direct personal force, and by whether harm occurs as a means or as a side-effect of action. We also show the relationship between a range of individual difference variables and responses to sacrificial moral dilemmas. Our results provide novel insights into the factors that influence people's moral judgments, and contribute to ongoing theoretical debates in moral psychology.