Cognitive Psychology最新文献

How do humans develop the capacity to reason? In five studies, we examined infants’ emerging ability to make exclusion inferences using negation, as in the disjunctive syllogism (P or Q; not P; therefore Q). Inspired by studies of non-human animals and older children, Experiments 1–3 used an exclusion task adapted from Call’s (2004) 2-cup paradigm and Experiments 4–5 used an exclusion task adapted from the blicket detector paradigm (Sobel & Kirkham, 2006). In both tasks, we found failure to make exclusion inferences at 15 months, fragile success at 17 months, and robust success by 20 months of age. These data converge with some prior evidence that fails to find a capacity to represent negation in infants younger than 15 months of age and conflict with other evidence from different paradigms that suggests infants do have this capacity. We discuss three different resolutions of these conflicting data, and suggest lines of further work that might adjudicate among them.

Cognitive control is guided by learning, as people adjust control to meet changing task demands. The two best-studied instances of “control-learning” are the enhancement of attentional task focus in response to increased frequencies of incongruent distracter stimuli, reflected in the list-wide proportion congruent (LWPC) effect, and the enhancement of switch-readiness in response to increased frequencies of task switches, reflected in the list-wide proportion switch (LWPS) effect. However, the latent architecture underpinning these adaptations in cognitive stability and flexibility – specifically, whether there is a single, domain-general, or multiple, domain-specific learners – is currently not known. To reveal the underlying structure of control-learning, we had a large sample of participants (N = 950) perform LWPC and LWPS paradigms, and afterwards assessed their explicit awareness of the task manipulations, as well as general cognitive ability and motivation. Structural equation modeling was used to evaluate several preregistered models representing different plausible hypotheses concerning the latent structure of control-learning. Task performance replicated standard LWPC and LWPS effects. Crucially, the model that best fit the data had correlated domain- and context-specific latent factors. Thus, people’s ability to adapt their on-task focus and between-task switch-readiness to changing levels of demand was mediated by distinct (though correlated) underlying factors. Model fit remained good when accounting for speed-accuracy trade-offs, variance in individual cognitive ability and self-reported motivation, as well as self-reported explicit awareness of manipulations and the order in which different levels of demand were experienced. Implications of these results for the cognitive architecture of dynamic cognitive control are discussed.

While distributional semantic models that represent word meanings as high-dimensional vectors induced from large text corpora have been shown to successfully predict human behavior across a wide range of tasks, they have also received criticism from different directions. These include concerns over their interpretability (how can numbers specifying abstract, latent dimensions represent meaning?) and their ability to capture variation in meaning (how can a single vector representation capture multiple different interpretations for the same expression?). Here, we demonstrate that semantic vectors can indeed rise up to these challenges, by training a mapping system (a simple linear regression) that predicts inter-individual variation in relational interpretations for compounds such as wood brush (for example brush FOR wood, or brush MADE OF wood) from (compositional) semantic vectors representing the meanings of these compounds. These predictions consistently beat different random baselines, both for familiar compounds (moon light, Experiment 1) as well as novel compounds (wood brush, Experiment 2), demonstrating that distributional semantic vectors encode variations in qualitative interpretations that can be decoded using techniques as simple as linear regression.

An intuition of ambivalence in cognition is particularly strong for complex decisions, for which the merits and demerits of different options are roughly equal but hard to compare. We examined information search in an experimental paradigm which tasked participants with an ambivalent question, while monitoring attentional dynamics concerning the information relevant to each option in different Areas of Interest (AOIs). We developed two dynamical models for describing eye tracking curves, for each response separately. The models incorporated a drift mechanism towards the various options, as in standard drift diffusion theory. In addition, they included a mechanism for intrinsic oscillation, which competed with the drift process and undermined eventual stabilization of the dynamics. The two models varied in the range of drift processes postulated. Higher support was observed for the simpler model, which only included drifts from an uncertainty state to either of two certainty states. In addition, model parameters could be weakly related to the eventual decision, complementing our knowledge of the way eye tracking structure relates to decision (notably the gaze cascade effect).

Most studies of visual-working memory employ one of two experimental paradigms: change-detection or continuous-stimulus reproduction. In this study, we extended the Interference Model (IM; Oberauer & Lin, 2017), which was designed for continuous reproduction, to the single-probe change-detection task. In continuous reproduction, participants occasionally report the non-target items instead of the target. The presence of non-target response is predicted by the Interference Model, which relies in part on the interference of non-target items to explain the set-size effect. By presenting a probe matching a non-target item, we can investigate the amount of interference from non-target items in change detection. As predicted by the Interference Model, we observed poorer performance in rejecting a probe matching a non-target item compared to a new probe (i.e., a cost due to intrusions from non-targets). We fitted the IM along with the Variable Precision, the Slot-Averaging, and the Neural-Population model to the data from two change-detection experiments. The models were equipped with a Bayesian decision rule based on the one used in Keshvari, van den Berg, and Ma (2013). The Interference Model and the Neural-Population model successfully predicted the set-size effect and the non-target intrusion cost, whereas the Variable Precision (VP) and Slot-Averaging (SA) models failed to predict the intrusion cost at all. Even with additional assumptions enabling VP and SA to produce intrusion costs, the IM still performed better than the competing models quantitatively.

Logic and common sense say that judging two stimuli as “same” is the converse of judging them as “different”. Empirically, however, ‘Same’-‘Different’ judgment data are anomalous in two major ways. The fast-‘Same’ effect violates the expectation that ‘Same’ reaction time (RT) should be predictable by extrapolating from ‘Different’ RT. The criterion effect violates the expectation that RTs measured when sameness is defined by a conjunction of matching attributes should predict RTs measured when sameness is defined by a disjunction of matching attributes. The two criteria are symmetrical, yet empirically they differ greatly, disjunctive judgments being by far the slower of the two. This study sought the sources of these two effects. With the aid of a cue, a selective-comparison method deconfounded the contributions of stimulus encoding and comparisons to the two effects. The results were paradoxical. Each additional irrelevant (uncued) letter in a random string incremented RT for conjunctive judgments as much as an additional relevant letter did. Yet irrelevant letters were not compared and relevant letters had to be compared. These results appeared again in a second experiment that used words as stimuli. Contrary to intuition, a distinct comparison mechanism—the heart of relative judgment models—is not necessary in judgments of sameness and difference. It is shown here that encoding can carry out the comparison function without the operation of a separate comparison mechanism. Attention mediates the process by selecting from the set of stimulus alternatives, thereby partitioning the set into the ‘Same’ and ‘Different’ subsets. The fast-‘Same’ and criterion effects result from a structural limitation on what attention can select at any one time. With attention mediating the task, ‘Same’-‘Different’ judgments become, in effect, the outcome of a testing of a hypothesis, bridging the distinction between absolute stimulus identification and relative judgments.

For causal knowledge to be worth learning, it must remain valid when that knowledge is applied. Because unknown background causes are potentially present, and may vary across the learning and application contexts, extricating the strength of a candidate cause requires an assumption regarding the decomposition of the observed outcome into the unobservable influences from the candidate and from background causes. Acquiring stable, useable causal knowledge is challenging when the search space of candidate causes is large, such that the reasoner’s current set of candidates may fail to include a cause that generalizes well to an application context. We have hypothesized that an indispensable navigation device that shapes our causal representations toward useable knowledge involves the concept of causal invariance – the sameness of how a cause operates to produce an effect across contexts. Here, we tested our causal invariance hypothesis by making use of the distinct mathematical functions expressing causal invariance for two outcome-variable types: continuous and binary. Our hypothesis predicts that, given identical prior domain knowledge, intuitive causal judgments should vary in accord with the causal-invariance function for a reasoner’s perceived outcome-variable type. The judgments are made as if the reasoner aspires to formulate causally invariant knowledge. Our experiments involved two cue-competition paradigms: blocking and overexpectation. Results show that adult humans tacitly use the appropriate causal-invariance functions for decomposition. Our analysis offers an explanation for the apparent elusiveness of the blocking effect and the adaptiveness of intuitive causal inference to the representation-dependent reality in the mind.

Many explanations have a distinctive, positive phenomenology: receiving or generating these explanations feels satisfying. Accordingly, we might expect this feeling of explanatory satisfaction to reinforce and motivate inquiry. Across five studies, we investigate how explanatory satisfaction plays this role: by motivating and reinforcing inquiry quite generally (“brute motivation” account), or by selectively guiding inquiry to support useful learning about the target of explanation (“aligned motivation” account). In Studies 1–2, we find that satisfaction with an explanation is related to several measures of perceived useful learning, and that greater satisfaction in turn predicts stronger curiosity about questions related to the explanation. However, in Studies 2–4, we find only tenuous evidence that satisfaction is related to actual learning, measured objectively through multiple-choice or free recall tests. In Study 4, we additionally show that perceptions of learning fully explain one seemingly specious feature of explanatory preferences studied in prior research: the preference for uninformative “reductive” explanations. Finally, in Study 5, we find that perceived learning is (at least in part) causally responsible for feelings of satisfaction. Together, these results point to what we call the “imperfectly aligned motivation” account: explanatory satisfaction selectively motivates inquiry towards learning explanatory information, but primarily through fallible perceptions of learning. Thus, satisfaction is likely to guide individuals towards lines of inquiry that support perceptions of learning, whether or not individuals actually are learning.

Induction benefits from useful priors. Penalized regression approaches, like ridge regression, shrink weights toward zero but zero association is usually not a sensible prior. Inspired by simple and robust decision heuristics humans use, we constructed non-zero priors for penalized regression models that provide robust and interpretable solutions across several tasks. Our approach enables estimates from a constrained model to serve as a prior for a more general model, yielding a principled way to interpolate between models of differing complexity. We successfully applied this approach to a number of decision and classification problems, as well as analyzing simulated brain imaging data. Models with robust priors had excellent worst-case performance. Solutions followed from the form of the heuristic that was used to derive the prior. These new algorithms can serve applications in data analysis and machine learning, as well as help in understanding how people transition from novice to expert performance.

Letters are often repeated in words in many languages. The present work explored the mechanisms underlying processing of repeated and unique letters in strings across three experimental paradigms. In a 2AFC perceptual identification task, the insertion but not the deletion of a letter was harder to detect when it was repeated than when it was unique (Exp. 1). In a masked primed same-different task, deletion primes produced the same priming effect regardless of deletion type (repeated, unique; Exp. 2), but insertion primes were more effective when the additional inserted letter created a repetition than when it did not (Exp. 3). In a same-different perceptual identification task, foils created by modifying a repetition, by either repeating the wrong letter or substituting a repeated letter, were harder to reject than foils created by modifying unique letters (Exp. 4). Thus, repetition effects were task-dependent. Since considering representations alone would suggest repetition effects would always occur or never occur, this indicates the importance of modelling task-specific processes. The similarity calculations embedded in the Overlap Model (Gomez et al., 2008) appeared to always predict a repetition effect, but its decision rule for the task of Experiment 1 allowed it to predict the asymmetry between insertions and deletions. In the Letters in Time and Retinotopic Space (LTRS; Adelman, 2011) model, repetition effects arise only from briefly presented stimuli as their perception is incomplete. It was therefore consistent with Experiments 2–4 but required a task-specific response bias to account for the insertion-deletion asymmetry of Experiment 1.