{"title":"From Fitness-Centered to Trait-Centered Explanations: What Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality Teach Us About Fitness – ADDENDUM","authors":"Peter Takacs, Guilhem Doulcier, Pierrick Bourrat","doi":"10.1017/psa.2024.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":508051,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"62 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140978945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay introduces, develops, and appraises the mitonuclear compatibility species concept (MCSC), identifying advantages and limitations with respect to alternative species concepts. While the consensus amongst most philosophers of biology is that (kind) essentialism about species is mistaken, and that species at most have relational essences, we appeal to the MCSC to defend a thoroughgoing intrinsic essentialism. Namely, the doctrine that species have fully intrinsic essences and, thus, are natural kinds (of sorts), while allowing that species aren’t categorically distinct.
{"title":"The Mitonuclear Compatibility Species Concept, Intrinsic Essentialism, and Natural Kinds","authors":"Kyle B. Heine, E. Shech","doi":"10.1017/psa.2024.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.18","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This essay introduces, develops, and appraises the mitonuclear compatibility species concept (MCSC), identifying advantages and limitations with respect to alternative species concepts. While the consensus amongst most philosophers of biology is that (kind) essentialism about species is mistaken, and that species at most have relational essences, we appeal to the MCSC to defend a thoroughgoing intrinsic essentialism. Namely, the doctrine that species have fully intrinsic essences and, thus, are natural kinds (of sorts), while allowing that species aren’t categorically distinct.","PeriodicalId":508051,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"123 51","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140985315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Philosophy of Astrophysics: Stars, Simulations, and the Struggle to Determine What is Out There”, edited by Nora Mills Boyd, Siska De Baerdemaeker, Kevin Heng, and Vera Matarese, Cham: Springer, 2023.","authors":"Silvia De Bianchi","doi":"10.1017/psa.2024.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":508051,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"124 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140985308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scientific hedges are communicative devices used to qualify and weaken scientific claims. Gregor Betz (2013) has argued – unconvincingly, we think – that hedging can rescue the value-free ideal for science. Nevertheless, Betz is onto something when he suggests there are political principles that recommend scientists hedge public-facing claims. In this paper, we recast this suggestion using the notion of public justification. We formulate and reject a Rawlsian argument that locates the justification for hedging in its ability to forge consensus. On our alternative proposal, hedging is often justified because it renders scientific claims as publicly accessible reasons.
{"title":"To Hedge or Not to Hedge: Scientific Claims and Public Justification","authors":"Zina B. Ward, Kathleen A. Creel","doi":"10.1017/psa.2024.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.17","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Scientific hedges are communicative devices used to qualify and weaken scientific claims. Gregor Betz (2013) has argued – unconvincingly, we think – that hedging can rescue the value-free ideal for science. Nevertheless, Betz is onto something when he suggests there are political principles that recommend scientists hedge public-facing claims. In this paper, we recast this suggestion using the notion of public justification. We formulate and reject a Rawlsian argument that locates the justification for hedging in its ability to forge consensus. On our alternative proposal, hedging is often justified because it renders scientific claims as publicly accessible reasons.","PeriodicalId":508051,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"85 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141004041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present a new justification for Methodological Triangulation (MT), the practice of using different methods to support the same scientific claim. Unlike existing accounts, our account captures cases in which the different methods in question are associated with, and relies on, incommensurable theories. Using a non-standard Bayesian model, we show that even in such cases, a commitment to the minimal form of epistemic conservatism, captured by the rigidity condition that stands at the basis of Jeffrey’s conditionalization, supports the practice of MT.
{"title":"Triangulation, Incommensurability, and Conditionalization","authors":"Amir Liron, Ittay Nissan-Rozen","doi":"10.1017/psa.2024.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.11","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We present a new justification for Methodological Triangulation (MT), the practice of using different methods to support the same scientific claim. Unlike existing accounts, our account captures cases in which the different methods in question are associated with, and relies on, incommensurable theories. Using a non-standard Bayesian model, we show that even in such cases, a commitment to the minimal form of epistemic conservatism, captured by the rigidity condition that stands at the basis of Jeffrey’s conditionalization, supports the practice of MT.","PeriodicalId":508051,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"19 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Werner Heisenberg’s Reality and its Order – CORRIGENDUM","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.180","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":508051,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":" January","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140383454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The generalized selected effects theory of function (GSE) holds that a trait’s proper function is an activity that historically caused its differential persistence or differential reproduction within a population, construed as a collection of individuals that impact each other’s persistence or reproduction chances. Several critics have taken aim at GSE on the grounds that its appeal to populations is either unfit for purpose or arbitrary. Here I revise GSE by articulating a notion of population that is fit to purpose and showing that its selection is not arbitrary but flows from the realist commitments of the selected effects theory itself.
{"title":"Functions and Populations: Sharpening the Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function","authors":"Justin Garson","doi":"10.1017/psa.2024.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.3","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The generalized selected effects theory of function (GSE) holds that a trait’s proper function is an activity that historically caused its differential persistence or differential reproduction within a population, construed as a collection of individuals that impact each other’s persistence or reproduction chances. Several critics have taken aim at GSE on the grounds that its appeal to populations is either unfit for purpose or arbitrary. Here I revise GSE by articulating a notion of population that is fit to purpose and showing that its selection is not arbitrary but flows from the realist commitments of the selected effects theory itself.","PeriodicalId":508051,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"383 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139834409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The generalized selected effects theory of function (GSE) holds that a trait’s proper function is an activity that historically caused its differential persistence or differential reproduction within a population, construed as a collection of individuals that impact each other’s persistence or reproduction chances. Several critics have taken aim at GSE on the grounds that its appeal to populations is either unfit for purpose or arbitrary. Here I revise GSE by articulating a notion of population that is fit to purpose and showing that its selection is not arbitrary but flows from the realist commitments of the selected effects theory itself.
{"title":"Functions and Populations: Sharpening the Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function","authors":"Justin Garson","doi":"10.1017/psa.2024.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.3","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The generalized selected effects theory of function (GSE) holds that a trait’s proper function is an activity that historically caused its differential persistence or differential reproduction within a population, construed as a collection of individuals that impact each other’s persistence or reproduction chances. Several critics have taken aim at GSE on the grounds that its appeal to populations is either unfit for purpose or arbitrary. Here I revise GSE by articulating a notion of population that is fit to purpose and showing that its selection is not arbitrary but flows from the realist commitments of the selected effects theory itself.","PeriodicalId":508051,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139774689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: One that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory-building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects vs in terms of complexity. I argue that both gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the context-sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts.
{"title":"What is the Replication Crisis a Crisis Of?","authors":"Uljana Feest","doi":"10.1017/psa.2024.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.2","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: One that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory-building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects vs in terms of complexity. I argue that both gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the context-sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts.","PeriodicalId":508051,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"16 S2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139793480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: One that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory-building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects vs in terms of complexity. I argue that both gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the context-sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts.
{"title":"What is the Replication Crisis a Crisis Of?","authors":"Uljana Feest","doi":"10.1017/psa.2024.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.2","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: One that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory-building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects vs in terms of complexity. I argue that both gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the context-sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts.","PeriodicalId":508051,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"58 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139853328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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