Pub Date : 2015-04-01DOI: 10.13169/intejcubastud.7.1.0079
Imilcy Balboa Navarro
In 1890, despite the price on his head, Manuel Garcia, the most charismatic and infamous bandit in Cuba quietly sipped beer with twelve men in a saloon in Santiago de las Vegas, just outside Havana. The press coverage of his appearance contributed to the legend of this King of the Countryside, who became the quintessential image of late-nineteenth-century banditry.1 The visibility of this type of bandit, who filled the pages of the newspapers and graced the accounts of colonial authorities, eventually dwarfed other forms of social protest, becoming the only manifestation of rural resistance in most historical accounts of the period.This line of investigation began with the publication of Eric Hobsbawm's Primitive Rebels (1958), which marked a milestone in the study of rural protest, by placing 'social bandits' at the centre of the narrative. His thesis attracted numerous specialists internationally who examined the phenomenon in various contexts and time periods.2 Despite the growing literature on social banditry, our understanding of rural protest in general and specifically the place of banditry within other forms of resistance remains undeveloped. The model of social banditry, in which Hobsbawm envisioned banditry as a form of peasant protest, does not explain the rest of the forms of rebellion present.3Using a case study of the Cuban countryside in the second half of the nineteenth century, this study explores other dimensions of rural protest, focusing on the role of the family, the relationship between bandits and their communities and the ways state repression influenced the actions of those involved in these crimes.4 The focus of this article is thus the everyday forms of resistance - arson, robbery, sabotage, for example - which may be less glorified than the King of the Countryside but are no less important. These were the primary - not primitive - forms of struggle that rather than openly challenging the existing structures of oppression, chipped away slowly at them.5The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a time of profound transformations in Cuba. Various important socioeconomic processes began with the abolition of slavery in 1886 and the subsequent expansion of capitalist agriculture. Moreover, the political arena was defined by three armed conflicts: the end of Spanish colonial rule, the North American intervention and finally the establishment of the republic in 1902.All these changes had powerful repercussions for the masses of workers and farmers. Rather than accepting these transformations passively, the popular classes sought to carve out their own political space within their given situation. They actively protested the increasingly unfavourable conditions in the countryside. As such, the popular protest was not a homogeneous and harmonious process that came about through predetermined or coordinated efforts. The multitude of causes for social protest begot a myriad of responses. This article explains the way evolving
1890年,古巴最具魅力、最臭名昭著的强盗曼努埃尔·加西亚(Manuel Garcia)不顾悬赏,在哈瓦那郊外拉斯维加斯圣地亚哥(Santiago de las Vegas)的一家酒馆里,与12个人安静地喝着啤酒。媒体对他外表的报道使这位乡村之王的传说更加传奇,他成为了19世纪晚期土匪的典型形象这种土匪的出现占据了报纸的版面,并为殖民当局的报道增光,最终使其他形式的社会抗议相形见绌,成为那个时期大多数历史记载中农村抵抗的唯一表现。这条调查路线始于埃里克·霍布斯鲍姆(Eric Hobsbawm)的《原始叛军》(1958)的出版,这本书将“社会土匪”置于叙述的中心,标志着农村抗议研究的一个里程碑。他的论文吸引了众多国际专家,他们在不同的背景和时期研究了这一现象尽管关于社会土匪的文献越来越多,但我们对农村抗议的总体理解,特别是对土匪在其他形式抵抗中的地位的理解,仍然没有得到发展。霍布斯鲍姆将社会盗匪模式设想为农民抗议的一种形式,但这种模式并不能解释当前其他形式的叛乱。3 .本研究以19世纪下半叶的古巴农村为例,探讨了农村抗议的其他方面,重点是家庭的作用、土匪与其社区之间的关系以及国家镇压如何影响参与这些犯罪的人的行动因此,本文的重点是日常形式的抵抗-纵火,抢劫,破坏,例如-可能不像农村之王那样荣耀,但同样重要。这些是主要的——而不是原始的——斗争形式,而不是公开挑战现有的压迫结构,而是慢慢地削弱它们。19世纪的最后25年是古巴发生深刻变革的时期。各种重要的社会经济进程始于1886年奴隶制的废除和随后资本主义农业的扩张。此外,政治舞台是由三次武装冲突决定的:西班牙殖民统治的结束,北美的干预,最后是1902年共和国的建立。所有这些变化都对工农群众产生了强烈的影响。大众阶级并没有被动地接受这些转变,而是在他们所处的环境中寻求开拓自己的政治空间。他们积极抗议农村日益恶劣的条件。因此,民众抗议并不是一个通过预先确定或协调一致的努力而产生的同质和和谐的过程。社会抗议的众多原因引发了无数回应。本文解释了在五个不同时期,不断变化的条件对农村抗议形式的影响:1。1878年至1885年间,土匪活动的第一阶段对应于中东部地区(圣克拉拉省、普林西比港省和古巴圣地亚哥省),这是第一次独立战争(十年战争,1868年至1878年)的发生地,这一发展促进了农村部门的动员,使其成为一个政治体系。第二个时期是1880-88年,与第一个时期重叠,但地理焦点在西部。每天的抵抗行动加上第一次土匪活动的爆发,反映了该岛的经济状况。第三个时期是1888年至1895年,这是殖民危机不断加深的时期,反映在失业率上升、工资低和土地稀缺上。盗匪变成了最重要的,虽然不是唯一的不满表现。在国家一级,民众部门的动员在独立战争爆发时达到高潮。…
{"title":"Bandits, Patriots or Delinquents? Social Protest in Rural Cuba (1878–1902)","authors":"Imilcy Balboa Navarro","doi":"10.13169/intejcubastud.7.1.0079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13169/intejcubastud.7.1.0079","url":null,"abstract":"In 1890, despite the price on his head, Manuel Garcia, the most charismatic and infamous bandit in Cuba quietly sipped beer with twelve men in a saloon in Santiago de las Vegas, just outside Havana. The press coverage of his appearance contributed to the legend of this King of the Countryside, who became the quintessential image of late-nineteenth-century banditry.1 The visibility of this type of bandit, who filled the pages of the newspapers and graced the accounts of colonial authorities, eventually dwarfed other forms of social protest, becoming the only manifestation of rural resistance in most historical accounts of the period.This line of investigation began with the publication of Eric Hobsbawm's Primitive Rebels (1958), which marked a milestone in the study of rural protest, by placing 'social bandits' at the centre of the narrative. His thesis attracted numerous specialists internationally who examined the phenomenon in various contexts and time periods.2 Despite the growing literature on social banditry, our understanding of rural protest in general and specifically the place of banditry within other forms of resistance remains undeveloped. The model of social banditry, in which Hobsbawm envisioned banditry as a form of peasant protest, does not explain the rest of the forms of rebellion present.3Using a case study of the Cuban countryside in the second half of the nineteenth century, this study explores other dimensions of rural protest, focusing on the role of the family, the relationship between bandits and their communities and the ways state repression influenced the actions of those involved in these crimes.4 The focus of this article is thus the everyday forms of resistance - arson, robbery, sabotage, for example - which may be less glorified than the King of the Countryside but are no less important. These were the primary - not primitive - forms of struggle that rather than openly challenging the existing structures of oppression, chipped away slowly at them.5The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a time of profound transformations in Cuba. Various important socioeconomic processes began with the abolition of slavery in 1886 and the subsequent expansion of capitalist agriculture. Moreover, the political arena was defined by three armed conflicts: the end of Spanish colonial rule, the North American intervention and finally the establishment of the republic in 1902.All these changes had powerful repercussions for the masses of workers and farmers. Rather than accepting these transformations passively, the popular classes sought to carve out their own political space within their given situation. They actively protested the increasingly unfavourable conditions in the countryside. As such, the popular protest was not a homogeneous and harmonious process that came about through predetermined or coordinated efforts. The multitude of causes for social protest begot a myriad of responses. This article explains the way evolving","PeriodicalId":254309,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Cuban Studies","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132809504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-04-01DOI: 10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.7.1.0016
R. Rodríguez, Harry R. Targ
Immediately after taking power in 1959, the new Cuban government took steps to implement the Moncada Programme.1 Such actions amounted to a strong and swiftstructural transformation that began incorporating new property and class relations. These actions included limiting the possibilities for private capital accumulation. The Cuban government saw these actions as a means to achieve economic sovereignty and social justice. The initial reaction of the US government - with the additional support of the Cuban propertied class - was to gradually apply economic pressure in the form of economic sanctions, political and diplomatic isolation, military threats and covert actions aimed at overthrowing the government.Consequently, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution marked the beginning of a process of profound socio-economic and political transformations representing a clean break with the prevailing social, economic and political patterns in the rest of the Western Hemisphere - a geopolitical space that had been a Monroe Doctrine-inspired US hegemonic domain.The idea of 'revolution' refers, in the case of Cuba, not only to a fundamental transformation of economic and political structures, people's consciousness of their place in society and the values that should determine human behaviour, but also to a projection of Cuba's experience onto the entire Western Hemisphere. In that sense, there had been no precedents in the Latin American context. As Samuel Farber has recently reminded us, authentic revolutions 'have reverberated in other lands as the idea spread that there are alternatives to oppressive systems that another world is possible'.2 In that sense, the Cuban revolution was also a symbolic challenge to global US hegemony.Moreover, revolution is not a fixed 'thing' but a process. This means changes in structures, patterns of behaviour, and consciousness are changing over time and, in the case of revolution, are moving towards, rather than away from, more complete human fulfilment. Some nations, such as the US, might see revolutionary ferment in various places as a threat to their commitment to the maintenance of a status quo. This hypothesis underpins the arguments presented below about the root causes of US foreign policy towards Cuba since the founding of the US itself. This view contradicts many other interpretations of the causes of US/ Cuban conflicts. The materials below refer to a variety of prevailing causal explanations of US foreign policy towards Cuba. But in the end, it is argued that none are as powerful an explanatory tool as that which hypothesises the fundamental contradictions between Cuban revolutionary ferment in search of national realisation and the US hegemonic quest for the maintenance of a status quo throughout the Western Hemisphere.Competing Explanations for the Reasons behind the Historical Relationship between the US and CubaUS policymakers and academics have postulated various explanations or rationales for US foreign po
{"title":"Us Foreign Policy towards Cuba: Historical Roots, Traditional Explanations and Alternative Perspectives","authors":"R. Rodríguez, Harry R. Targ","doi":"10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.7.1.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.7.1.0016","url":null,"abstract":"Immediately after taking power in 1959, the new Cuban government took steps to implement the Moncada Programme.1 Such actions amounted to a strong and swiftstructural transformation that began incorporating new property and class relations. These actions included limiting the possibilities for private capital accumulation. The Cuban government saw these actions as a means to achieve economic sovereignty and social justice. The initial reaction of the US government - with the additional support of the Cuban propertied class - was to gradually apply economic pressure in the form of economic sanctions, political and diplomatic isolation, military threats and covert actions aimed at overthrowing the government.Consequently, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution marked the beginning of a process of profound socio-economic and political transformations representing a clean break with the prevailing social, economic and political patterns in the rest of the Western Hemisphere - a geopolitical space that had been a Monroe Doctrine-inspired US hegemonic domain.The idea of 'revolution' refers, in the case of Cuba, not only to a fundamental transformation of economic and political structures, people's consciousness of their place in society and the values that should determine human behaviour, but also to a projection of Cuba's experience onto the entire Western Hemisphere. In that sense, there had been no precedents in the Latin American context. As Samuel Farber has recently reminded us, authentic revolutions 'have reverberated in other lands as the idea spread that there are alternatives to oppressive systems that another world is possible'.2 In that sense, the Cuban revolution was also a symbolic challenge to global US hegemony.Moreover, revolution is not a fixed 'thing' but a process. This means changes in structures, patterns of behaviour, and consciousness are changing over time and, in the case of revolution, are moving towards, rather than away from, more complete human fulfilment. Some nations, such as the US, might see revolutionary ferment in various places as a threat to their commitment to the maintenance of a status quo. This hypothesis underpins the arguments presented below about the root causes of US foreign policy towards Cuba since the founding of the US itself. This view contradicts many other interpretations of the causes of US/ Cuban conflicts. The materials below refer to a variety of prevailing causal explanations of US foreign policy towards Cuba. But in the end, it is argued that none are as powerful an explanatory tool as that which hypothesises the fundamental contradictions between Cuban revolutionary ferment in search of national realisation and the US hegemonic quest for the maintenance of a status quo throughout the Western Hemisphere.Competing Explanations for the Reasons behind the Historical Relationship between the US and CubaUS policymakers and academics have postulated various explanations or rationales for US foreign po","PeriodicalId":254309,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Cuban Studies","volume":"31 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134153008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-04-01DOI: 10.13169/intejcubastud.7.1.0008
Salim Lamrani, L. Oberg
On 16 January 2015, certain easements to the US embargo of Cuba were announced and have become effective. They fall within the framework of the process of normalisation of bilateral relations initiated by Presidents Barack Obama and Raul Castro. While they fail to put an end to US economic sanctions, they are nonetheless a positive step, confirming Washington's willingness to end an anachronistic policy that is both cruel and ineffective. This policy is in fact the main obstacle to the development of the island, negatively affecting the most vulnerable sectors of the Cuban population. It has aroused the unanimous condemnation of the international community.1The first measure concerns opportunities for travel to Cuba. While US citizens are still not allowed to visit the island as ordinary tourists - although they are allowed to travel freely to China, Vietnam and North Korea - Washington has decided to facilitate travel for those who fit within twelve specific categories authorised by law. The twelve categories are (1) family visits; (2) official business of the US government, foreign governments, and certain intergovernmental organisations; (3) journalistic activity; (4) professional research and professional meetings; (5) educational activities; (6) religious activities; (7) public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions; (8) support for the Cuban people; (9) humanitarian projects; (10) activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes; (11) exportation, importation, or transmission of information or information materials; and (12) certain export transactions that may be considered for authorization under existing regulations and guidelines. Thus, within the new framework, US travel and airline offices can now offer their services without being required to first obtain a specific licence from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC, Treasury Department). Furthermore, citizens allowed to travel to Cuba can now use their credit cards on the island without a limit on the amount that can be charged. They are also allowed to carry up to $10,000 and can purchase up to $400 in merchandise, including 100 in tobacco and alcohol.2At the level of remittances to Cuba, it is now possible to send $2000 per quarter, against 500 before. However, according to US law, senior government officials and members of the Communist Party may still not receive family assistance from the US. Max Lesnik, director of the Miami-based magazine La Nueva Replica, has criticised this restriction:For a long time we have accused the Havana government of having divided the Cuban family for political and ideological reasons. However, it now appears that it is U.S. policy that arbitrarily separates families, for example, preventing a Miami Cuban from supporting her mother in Havana on the grounds that she is a Communist Party militant or a member of the government.3In addition, US citizens may also now provide unlimit
2015年1月16日,美国宣布了对古巴禁运的某些缓和措施,并已生效。它们属于美国总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)和劳尔•卡斯特罗(Raul Castro)发起的双边关系正常化进程的框架。尽管它们未能结束美国的经济制裁,但它们仍然是积极的一步,证实了华盛顿愿意结束一项既残酷又无效的过时政策。这一政策实际上是古巴发展的主要障碍,对古巴人口中最脆弱的部分产生不利影响。这引起了国际社会的一致谴责。第一项措施涉及到前往古巴旅行的机会。尽管美国公民仍不被允许以普通游客的身份访问台湾(尽管他们可以自由前往中国、越南和朝鲜),但华盛顿方面已决定为那些符合法律授权的12种特定类别的人提供便利。这十二个类别是(1)探亲;(2)美国政府、外国政府和某些政府间组织的公务;(三)新闻活动;(四)专业研究和专业会议;(五)教育活动;(六)宗教活动;(七)公开演出、诊所、讲习班、体育比赛和其他比赛、展览;(八)对古巴人民的支持;(九)人道主义项目;(十)非公募基金会、研究机构、教育机构的活动;(十一)信息、信息资料的输出、输入、传递;(12)根据现行法规和指导方针可能考虑授权的某些出口交易。因此,在新的框架下,美国旅游和航空公司办事处现在可以提供他们的服务,而不需要首先获得外国资产控制办公室(OFAC,财政部)的特定许可证。此外,被允许前往古巴的公民现在可以在岛上使用信用卡,而不受可收取金额的限制。他们还被允许携带高达1万美元的物品,并可以购买高达400美元的商品,其中包括100美元的烟草和酒精。在向古巴汇款的水平上,现在每个季度可以汇款2000美元,而以前是500美元。然而,根据美国法律,高级政府官员和共产党成员可能仍然无法获得美国的家庭援助。迈阿密杂志《新复制品》(La Nueva Replica)的主编马克斯•莱斯尼克(Max Lesnik)批评了这一限制:“长期以来,我们一直指责哈瓦那政府出于政治和意识形态的原因分裂了古巴大家庭。”然而,现在看来是美国的政策武断地将家庭分开,例如,阻止迈阿密的古巴人支持她在哈瓦那的母亲,理由是她是共产党武装分子或政府成员。此外,美国公民现在还可以为人道主义项目和私营企业的发展向古巴人提供无限制的财政援助。4 .在电信领域,美国公司在商务部颁发的许可证下,现在可以向古巴出口其技术。因此,古巴人可以购买电脑、软件、手机、电视等。古巴私营部门也将能够购买建筑和农业设备。然而,国内企业被排除在外。与此同时,古巴私营部门生产的某些商品现在可以出口到美国。5但是,鉴于古巴绝大多数商品和服务实际上是由国营企业生产的,这些措施的影响仍然相当有限。在金融领域,与古巴有商业联系的美国公司现在可以在古巴的金融机构开设银行账户。华盛顿还宣布暂停执行1992年《托里切利法案》(Torricelli Act)的一个条款,该条款禁止在接下来的六个月内停靠古巴港口的任何外国船只前往美国。…
{"title":"Rapprochement Cuba/usa: Opportunities and Obstacles","authors":"Salim Lamrani, L. Oberg","doi":"10.13169/intejcubastud.7.1.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13169/intejcubastud.7.1.0008","url":null,"abstract":"On 16 January 2015, certain easements to the US embargo of Cuba were announced and have become effective. They fall within the framework of the process of normalisation of bilateral relations initiated by Presidents Barack Obama and Raul Castro. While they fail to put an end to US economic sanctions, they are nonetheless a positive step, confirming Washington's willingness to end an anachronistic policy that is both cruel and ineffective. This policy is in fact the main obstacle to the development of the island, negatively affecting the most vulnerable sectors of the Cuban population. It has aroused the unanimous condemnation of the international community.1The first measure concerns opportunities for travel to Cuba. While US citizens are still not allowed to visit the island as ordinary tourists - although they are allowed to travel freely to China, Vietnam and North Korea - Washington has decided to facilitate travel for those who fit within twelve specific categories authorised by law. The twelve categories are (1) family visits; (2) official business of the US government, foreign governments, and certain intergovernmental organisations; (3) journalistic activity; (4) professional research and professional meetings; (5) educational activities; (6) religious activities; (7) public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions; (8) support for the Cuban people; (9) humanitarian projects; (10) activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes; (11) exportation, importation, or transmission of information or information materials; and (12) certain export transactions that may be considered for authorization under existing regulations and guidelines. Thus, within the new framework, US travel and airline offices can now offer their services without being required to first obtain a specific licence from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC, Treasury Department). Furthermore, citizens allowed to travel to Cuba can now use their credit cards on the island without a limit on the amount that can be charged. They are also allowed to carry up to $10,000 and can purchase up to $400 in merchandise, including 100 in tobacco and alcohol.2At the level of remittances to Cuba, it is now possible to send $2000 per quarter, against 500 before. However, according to US law, senior government officials and members of the Communist Party may still not receive family assistance from the US. Max Lesnik, director of the Miami-based magazine La Nueva Replica, has criticised this restriction:For a long time we have accused the Havana government of having divided the Cuban family for political and ideological reasons. However, it now appears that it is U.S. policy that arbitrarily separates families, for example, preventing a Miami Cuban from supporting her mother in Havana on the grounds that she is a Communist Party militant or a member of the government.3In addition, US citizens may also now provide unlimit","PeriodicalId":254309,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Cuban Studies","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122112884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-04-01DOI: 10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.7.1.0099
M. Barcia
In 1820, Cuban priest Juan Bernardo O'Gavan arrived in Madrid with the testing mission of sabotaging the bilateral treaty signed in 1817 between Great Britain and Spain that obliged the latter to bring its involvement in the transatlantic slave trade to an end. For O'Gavan and his employers, the end of this human trafficking was a downright annoyance that threatened the sugar cane-based prosperity enjoyed by the island since the Haitian revolution had given them the opportunity to become leading suppliers of sugar for the international markets. That sugar, however, could only be harvested and sold at astronomical profits thanks to the slave labour imported from Africa. For O'Gavan and his colleagues, begging for the reestablishment of the trade came hand-in-hand with a series of excuses and justifications that concealed the real conditions of existence of their slaves in Cuba's urban and rural environments.This article explores the ways in which Cuban-based merchants and planters attempted to keep a robust control upon their increasingly large slave population, while endeavouring to show to the rest of the world an idyllic picture of Cuban slavery. O'Gavan's pamphleteering in Madrid in the early 1820s was hardly an exception. As a matter of fact, from the late 1790s, Cuban authorities, merchants and planters joined forces in a vain effort to portray Cuban slavery as a harmless and paternalistic institution, exempt from the brutalities that they shrewdly attributed to other slave systems in the Americas.On the one hand, Cuban authorities, merchants and planters offered a public transcript full of praise for the slave society they were building and continuously drummed it up as a humane and well-balanced social system. On the other hand, they relied on a day-to-day hidden transcript that they used and abused to blame their slaves, especially those African-born, for all the flaws they could find in the system.1 This article will also explore the ways in which they built up these public and hidden transcripts and the manner in which their public and private discourses overlapped when necessary, and establish to what degree they were successful in doing so. It will argue that in order to prevail, while hiding the daily acts of inhumanity inherent to the slave system, they used their most gifted intellectuals and their religious and political leverage in order to maintain slavery in Cuba and to increase the transatlantic slave trade.To gain a better understanding of the daily practices of these men, this article relies on the concepts of 'Public' and 'Hidden Transcript', as defined by James C. Scott in his groundbreaking book Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (1990). By 'Public Transcript', it refers to all practices and discourses elaborated by the Cuban-based elites in order to portray to the rest of the world, an idyllic picture of slavery in Cuba. By opposition, this article considers as a 'Hidden Transcript', those other pr
{"title":"Powerful Subjects: The Duplicity of Slave Owners in Nineteenth-Century Cuba","authors":"M. Barcia","doi":"10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.7.1.0099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.7.1.0099","url":null,"abstract":"In 1820, Cuban priest Juan Bernardo O'Gavan arrived in Madrid with the testing mission of sabotaging the bilateral treaty signed in 1817 between Great Britain and Spain that obliged the latter to bring its involvement in the transatlantic slave trade to an end. For O'Gavan and his employers, the end of this human trafficking was a downright annoyance that threatened the sugar cane-based prosperity enjoyed by the island since the Haitian revolution had given them the opportunity to become leading suppliers of sugar for the international markets. That sugar, however, could only be harvested and sold at astronomical profits thanks to the slave labour imported from Africa. For O'Gavan and his colleagues, begging for the reestablishment of the trade came hand-in-hand with a series of excuses and justifications that concealed the real conditions of existence of their slaves in Cuba's urban and rural environments.This article explores the ways in which Cuban-based merchants and planters attempted to keep a robust control upon their increasingly large slave population, while endeavouring to show to the rest of the world an idyllic picture of Cuban slavery. O'Gavan's pamphleteering in Madrid in the early 1820s was hardly an exception. As a matter of fact, from the late 1790s, Cuban authorities, merchants and planters joined forces in a vain effort to portray Cuban slavery as a harmless and paternalistic institution, exempt from the brutalities that they shrewdly attributed to other slave systems in the Americas.On the one hand, Cuban authorities, merchants and planters offered a public transcript full of praise for the slave society they were building and continuously drummed it up as a humane and well-balanced social system. On the other hand, they relied on a day-to-day hidden transcript that they used and abused to blame their slaves, especially those African-born, for all the flaws they could find in the system.1 This article will also explore the ways in which they built up these public and hidden transcripts and the manner in which their public and private discourses overlapped when necessary, and establish to what degree they were successful in doing so. It will argue that in order to prevail, while hiding the daily acts of inhumanity inherent to the slave system, they used their most gifted intellectuals and their religious and political leverage in order to maintain slavery in Cuba and to increase the transatlantic slave trade.To gain a better understanding of the daily practices of these men, this article relies on the concepts of 'Public' and 'Hidden Transcript', as defined by James C. Scott in his groundbreaking book Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (1990). By 'Public Transcript', it refers to all practices and discourses elaborated by the Cuban-based elites in order to portray to the rest of the world, an idyllic picture of slavery in Cuba. By opposition, this article considers as a 'Hidden Transcript', those other pr","PeriodicalId":254309,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Cuban Studies","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134294063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-07-01DOI: 10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0205
Danay Quintana Nedelcu
IntroductionA reflection on the challenges facing public universities leads us to a theme (among many) of the centrality of the social sciences: how far should the state be, desired to be or actually be responsible for education in a country? Can direct government involvement produce favourable results in solving the educational problem? The analysis of the role of education cannot be done without a reflection about the State, the development models that are driven by this structure, the power groups that give it meaning, the kind of society that results and a holistic view of public policies (Del Castillo 2014) that serves as a tool (in a double sense) of governments to solve public problems that they themselves have defined in a (desired) dialogue with society. Just as it is essential to understand the State to analyse education, education also 'talks' about the kind of state and society in which it occurs.Education as a public issue is an idea as old as ancient Greece. Since then the state has been defined as the entity that is ultimately responsible for the formation of the citizens in the polis: the meaning of the State is, in its superior essence, the Paideia1 (Werner 1971). From this statement we return to the political status of (public) education.The debates on education as a public issue have transcended the field of research. They also exceed domestic politics, standing on the top of the global agenda. Today we find tensions between the models proposed by governments (pressured by international organisations) and those desired by society which have led to a climate of direct confrontation. We see examples of this everywhere: in the US and its most recent reform of the public school system, the education reforms passed in Mexico, the protests in the university student movement of Chile, the strike of teachers in Brazil, controversial university reform in Ecuador in recent years and the university student movement unleashed in Colombia in 2011 are a few of the flashpoints that demonstrate the social dynamics around the problems facing the education sector in general and universities in particular.The consequences of the neoliberal educational model (Gentili 1996; Puiggros 1996) have challenged the assumed direct link between education and development, although the World Bank insists on it (Banco Mundial 2012) and unresolved social problems in the Latin American region such as poverty, inequality and inequity (Blanco, 2012; Gajardo 2012) only serve to trigger deep crises in the current paradigms of the social function of education and what it implies: the confrontation between reality and utopia.Immersed in this scenario, the Cuban case is symptomatic of a different situation, though not without its own tensions. In recent years, the government and Cuban society have been involved in a major process of change: according to many, the most important in the last 50 years. The changes are projected in the Guidelines of the Economic and Social
{"title":"Cuban Education between Revolution and Reform","authors":"Danay Quintana Nedelcu","doi":"10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0205","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionA reflection on the challenges facing public universities leads us to a theme (among many) of the centrality of the social sciences: how far should the state be, desired to be or actually be responsible for education in a country? Can direct government involvement produce favourable results in solving the educational problem? The analysis of the role of education cannot be done without a reflection about the State, the development models that are driven by this structure, the power groups that give it meaning, the kind of society that results and a holistic view of public policies (Del Castillo 2014) that serves as a tool (in a double sense) of governments to solve public problems that they themselves have defined in a (desired) dialogue with society. Just as it is essential to understand the State to analyse education, education also 'talks' about the kind of state and society in which it occurs.Education as a public issue is an idea as old as ancient Greece. Since then the state has been defined as the entity that is ultimately responsible for the formation of the citizens in the polis: the meaning of the State is, in its superior essence, the Paideia1 (Werner 1971). From this statement we return to the political status of (public) education.The debates on education as a public issue have transcended the field of research. They also exceed domestic politics, standing on the top of the global agenda. Today we find tensions between the models proposed by governments (pressured by international organisations) and those desired by society which have led to a climate of direct confrontation. We see examples of this everywhere: in the US and its most recent reform of the public school system, the education reforms passed in Mexico, the protests in the university student movement of Chile, the strike of teachers in Brazil, controversial university reform in Ecuador in recent years and the university student movement unleashed in Colombia in 2011 are a few of the flashpoints that demonstrate the social dynamics around the problems facing the education sector in general and universities in particular.The consequences of the neoliberal educational model (Gentili 1996; Puiggros 1996) have challenged the assumed direct link between education and development, although the World Bank insists on it (Banco Mundial 2012) and unresolved social problems in the Latin American region such as poverty, inequality and inequity (Blanco, 2012; Gajardo 2012) only serve to trigger deep crises in the current paradigms of the social function of education and what it implies: the confrontation between reality and utopia.Immersed in this scenario, the Cuban case is symptomatic of a different situation, though not without its own tensions. In recent years, the government and Cuban society have been involved in a major process of change: according to many, the most important in the last 50 years. The changes are projected in the Guidelines of the Economic and Social","PeriodicalId":254309,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Cuban Studies","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123376641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-07-01DOI: 10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0127
Salim Lamrani
Eusebio Leal Spengler is City Historian of Havana, the 'City of Columns', as Alejo Carpentier liked to call it. A Doctor of Historical Sciences (University of Havana), he is a specialist in archaeological science and internationally recognised for his work in preserving the historic character of the Cuban capital.Born in 1942 and self-educated in his youth, Eusebio Leal was a disciple of Emilio Roig de Leushenring, founder of the Office of the Historian of Havana, the leadership of which Leal assumed in 1967.The mission of the Historian's Office is to contribute to the dissemination of Cuban history and culture through 'the preservation of material and spiritual symbols and expressions of nationality [... and] the collective historical and cultural memory of the city, especially its Historic Centre', the largest such colonial centre in Latin America.He is also President of the National Monuments Commission, a United Nations Goodwill Ambassador and a member of the unicameral Cuban Parliament. Since 1981, Leal has been responsible for the restoration and preservation of the Historic Centre of Havana, a national monument since 1976 and a Heritage for Humanity site since 1982.Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the advent of the Special Period in Time of Peace, Cuba was plunged into a deep economic crisis. Leal was nonetheless charged with continuing the work of restoring the Historic Centre of the capital, but with severely limited resources. As head of the General Directorate of Cultural Heritage, a new institution created for this purpose, he managed to obtain a certain degree of autonomy from the authorities in the management of the Office of the Historian but only a limited US$1 million budget.Nonetheless, Leal has transformed that institution into a veritable economic and cultural network that includes hotels, restaurants, shops, museums and construction and restoration workshops that are capable of generating the funds necessary to preserve the Historic Centre. The results have been spectacular and have earned him worldwide fame. In total, nearly 100 old buildings, for the most part complex structures of great historical importance, have been restored.Eusebio Leal has also expanded the scope of responsibility of the Office of the Historian. He has brought new energy to the cultural and social life of Old Havana with a multitude of activities, which are held monthly in museums, cultural centres, libraries, research laboratories and elsewhere.Leal was able to demonstrate that saving the cultural patrimony of the city was possible, even under conditions of extreme economic adversity. The original US$1 million invested generates more than 100 million in resources today. His excellent management abilities and his love for Havana have made his work an undeniable economic and cultural success.A man of exceptional culture, a winner of the world's highest honours, he is considered to be one of the three greatest living Cuban speakers
{"title":"Conversations with Eusebio Leal Spengler, City Historian of Havana: 'We Are an Island and We Need to Have an Ongoing Dialogue with the World That Surrounds Us. Any Attempt to Isolate Us Is a Mistake.'","authors":"Salim Lamrani","doi":"10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0127","url":null,"abstract":"Eusebio Leal Spengler is City Historian of Havana, the 'City of Columns', as Alejo Carpentier liked to call it. A Doctor of Historical Sciences (University of Havana), he is a specialist in archaeological science and internationally recognised for his work in preserving the historic character of the Cuban capital.Born in 1942 and self-educated in his youth, Eusebio Leal was a disciple of Emilio Roig de Leushenring, founder of the Office of the Historian of Havana, the leadership of which Leal assumed in 1967.The mission of the Historian's Office is to contribute to the dissemination of Cuban history and culture through 'the preservation of material and spiritual symbols and expressions of nationality [... and] the collective historical and cultural memory of the city, especially its Historic Centre', the largest such colonial centre in Latin America.He is also President of the National Monuments Commission, a United Nations Goodwill Ambassador and a member of the unicameral Cuban Parliament. Since 1981, Leal has been responsible for the restoration and preservation of the Historic Centre of Havana, a national monument since 1976 and a Heritage for Humanity site since 1982.Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the advent of the Special Period in Time of Peace, Cuba was plunged into a deep economic crisis. Leal was nonetheless charged with continuing the work of restoring the Historic Centre of the capital, but with severely limited resources. As head of the General Directorate of Cultural Heritage, a new institution created for this purpose, he managed to obtain a certain degree of autonomy from the authorities in the management of the Office of the Historian but only a limited US$1 million budget.Nonetheless, Leal has transformed that institution into a veritable economic and cultural network that includes hotels, restaurants, shops, museums and construction and restoration workshops that are capable of generating the funds necessary to preserve the Historic Centre. The results have been spectacular and have earned him worldwide fame. In total, nearly 100 old buildings, for the most part complex structures of great historical importance, have been restored.Eusebio Leal has also expanded the scope of responsibility of the Office of the Historian. He has brought new energy to the cultural and social life of Old Havana with a multitude of activities, which are held monthly in museums, cultural centres, libraries, research laboratories and elsewhere.Leal was able to demonstrate that saving the cultural patrimony of the city was possible, even under conditions of extreme economic adversity. The original US$1 million invested generates more than 100 million in resources today. His excellent management abilities and his love for Havana have made his work an undeniable economic and cultural success.A man of exceptional culture, a winner of the world's highest honours, he is considered to be one of the three greatest living Cuban speakers","PeriodicalId":254309,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Cuban Studies","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126100626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-07-01DOI: 10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0120
Carlos Alzugaray Treto, S. Wilkinson
Some analysts are sceptical about the success of the resumed negotiations between the European Union (EU) and Cuba, as neither of the parties has waived their starting positions. Indeed, Europe has reiterated that 'this is not a change in the previous policy. As we support reform and modernization in Cuba, we have consistently raised our concerns about human rights, which will remain at the centre of this relationship'.2 As stated, 'Cuba will consider the invitation from the European side, in a respectful, constructive manner and remain bound to its sovereignty and national interests'.3However, the mere fact that these negotiations had commenced shows that both Brussels and Havana are prioritising pragmatism and a willingness to create meaningful economic and trade relations facilitated and channelled through a legal instrument.Of these diplomatic steps several questions arise: What are the interests of Cuba in its relations with the EU and which policy has been followed to bring them about? What are the interests of the EU and how it has sought to achieve them? How important is it for Cuba to advance negotiations at this time when the Common Position adopted by the EU in 1996 remains in force? What are the prospects?Interests and Politics between Cuba and the EUWhen Washington imposed the economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba, American leaders had hoped that their allies would add to these measures. However, one after another, from Canada to Japan and Western Europe, they refused and cooperated with revolutionary Cuba in different ways and forms.4Given its composition, uniqueness and constant widening and deepening, negotiations with the EU have always been complex. The EU is not a state but a group that initially comprised 6 Western European nations that today is a motley collection of 28 members including the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. If it is a commonplace in international relations to not consider states as rational actors, it is much less the case with the EU, which has been described by one of its most respected historical leaders, Frenchman Jacques Delors, as an 'unidentified political object'. To this should be added the confusing institutional framework in which competing intergovernmental bodies (such as the European Council and its subsidiary bodies) and the supranational (such as the Commission, Parliament or the Supreme Court) do not always operate in perfect harmony.Goran Therborn has speculated that in the contemporary EU three, not necessarily antagonistic, trends are emerging: a global trading power, unconditional ally of the US5 and 'global Scandinavia'. According to him, the EU is these three things at once and behaves interchangeably depending on the topic in question.6It is no wonder the path of the process of finding an agreement between Cuba and the EU has been long and thorny. It is a simplification (which some Cuban colleagues incur) to attribute the difficulties and obstacles to a
{"title":"Towards a New Phase in Relations with the European Union","authors":"Carlos Alzugaray Treto, S. Wilkinson","doi":"10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0120","url":null,"abstract":"Some analysts are sceptical about the success of the resumed negotiations between the European Union (EU) and Cuba, as neither of the parties has waived their starting positions. Indeed, Europe has reiterated that 'this is not a change in the previous policy. As we support reform and modernization in Cuba, we have consistently raised our concerns about human rights, which will remain at the centre of this relationship'.2 As stated, 'Cuba will consider the invitation from the European side, in a respectful, constructive manner and remain bound to its sovereignty and national interests'.3However, the mere fact that these negotiations had commenced shows that both Brussels and Havana are prioritising pragmatism and a willingness to create meaningful economic and trade relations facilitated and channelled through a legal instrument.Of these diplomatic steps several questions arise: What are the interests of Cuba in its relations with the EU and which policy has been followed to bring them about? What are the interests of the EU and how it has sought to achieve them? How important is it for Cuba to advance negotiations at this time when the Common Position adopted by the EU in 1996 remains in force? What are the prospects?Interests and Politics between Cuba and the EUWhen Washington imposed the economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba, American leaders had hoped that their allies would add to these measures. However, one after another, from Canada to Japan and Western Europe, they refused and cooperated with revolutionary Cuba in different ways and forms.4Given its composition, uniqueness and constant widening and deepening, negotiations with the EU have always been complex. The EU is not a state but a group that initially comprised 6 Western European nations that today is a motley collection of 28 members including the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. If it is a commonplace in international relations to not consider states as rational actors, it is much less the case with the EU, which has been described by one of its most respected historical leaders, Frenchman Jacques Delors, as an 'unidentified political object'. To this should be added the confusing institutional framework in which competing intergovernmental bodies (such as the European Council and its subsidiary bodies) and the supranational (such as the Commission, Parliament or the Supreme Court) do not always operate in perfect harmony.Goran Therborn has speculated that in the contemporary EU three, not necessarily antagonistic, trends are emerging: a global trading power, unconditional ally of the US5 and 'global Scandinavia'. According to him, the EU is these three things at once and behaves interchangeably depending on the topic in question.6It is no wonder the path of the process of finding an agreement between Cuba and the EU has been long and thorny. It is a simplification (which some Cuban colleagues incur) to attribute the difficulties and obstacles to a ","PeriodicalId":254309,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Cuban Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127037474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-07-01DOI: 10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0137
Steve Ludlam
IntroductionThis journal has recently published a series of important articles on the process of economic reform in Cuba, especially since the public consultation and Communist Party Congress that resulted in the adoption in 2011 of the Lineamientos de la Politica Economica y Social del Partido y la Revolucion (Guidelines of the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution; Kassman 2012; Lamrani 2012; Ludlam 2012; O'Sullivan 2012; PCC 2011; Peters 2012; Rodriguez 2013; Triana Cordovi 2013; Wilkinson 2012; Wylie and Glidden 2013). Very little of that analysis, though, made much comment on the announcement of a new form of social property in the proposals to form non- agri- cultural cooperatives of manual and professional workers in both the service and the production sectors. In his article, nevertheless, one leading Cuban economist at the heart of the change process identified the operation of non-agricultural cooperatives as one of the four policies 'decisive for the transformation process' during 2013/14 (Triana Cordovi 2013: 126). And in the major new academic collection on cooperativism and socialism in Cuba, the claim is made that the island's changed socio-economic reality has opened a new era of cooperativism in the history of the Revolution (Fernandez Peiso 2012b: 392-3).The Cuban Constitution refers only, in article 20, to agricultural cooperatives of small producers and makes no reference to them constituting a socialist form of property (Republica de Cuba 1992: 13). The Lineamientos, though, opened this new departure in the following sections (PCC 2011, official English translation):COOPERATIVES25. Grade 1 cooperatives shall be established as a socialist form of joint ownership in various sectors. A cooperative is a business organization that owns its estate and represents a distinct legal person. Its members are individuals who contribute assets or labor and its purpose is to supply useful goods and services to society and its costs are covered with its own income.26. The legal instrument that regulates the cooperatives must make sure that this organization, as form of social property, is not sold or otherwise assigned in ownership to any other cooperative or any non-State organization or any natural person.27. A cooperative maintains contractual relations with other cooperatives, companies, State-funded entities and other non-State organizations. After satisfying its commitment with the State, the cooperative may pursue sales operations free from intermediaries and in accordance with the business activity it is authorized to perform.28. Subject to compliance with the appropriate laws and after observance of its tax and contribution obligations, each cooperative determines the income payable to its employees and the distribution of its profits.29. Grade 2 cooperatives shall be formed and the partners of which shall be Grade 1 cooperatives. A Grade 2 Cooperative shall represent a separate legal person that owns assets. Th
{"title":"COOPERATIVAS NO AGROPECUARIAS: tHe eMerGenCe of a neW forM of SoCIal ProPertY In Cuba","authors":"Steve Ludlam","doi":"10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0137","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThis journal has recently published a series of important articles on the process of economic reform in Cuba, especially since the public consultation and Communist Party Congress that resulted in the adoption in 2011 of the Lineamientos de la Politica Economica y Social del Partido y la Revolucion (Guidelines of the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution; Kassman 2012; Lamrani 2012; Ludlam 2012; O'Sullivan 2012; PCC 2011; Peters 2012; Rodriguez 2013; Triana Cordovi 2013; Wilkinson 2012; Wylie and Glidden 2013). Very little of that analysis, though, made much comment on the announcement of a new form of social property in the proposals to form non- agri- cultural cooperatives of manual and professional workers in both the service and the production sectors. In his article, nevertheless, one leading Cuban economist at the heart of the change process identified the operation of non-agricultural cooperatives as one of the four policies 'decisive for the transformation process' during 2013/14 (Triana Cordovi 2013: 126). And in the major new academic collection on cooperativism and socialism in Cuba, the claim is made that the island's changed socio-economic reality has opened a new era of cooperativism in the history of the Revolution (Fernandez Peiso 2012b: 392-3).The Cuban Constitution refers only, in article 20, to agricultural cooperatives of small producers and makes no reference to them constituting a socialist form of property (Republica de Cuba 1992: 13). The Lineamientos, though, opened this new departure in the following sections (PCC 2011, official English translation):COOPERATIVES25. Grade 1 cooperatives shall be established as a socialist form of joint ownership in various sectors. A cooperative is a business organization that owns its estate and represents a distinct legal person. Its members are individuals who contribute assets or labor and its purpose is to supply useful goods and services to society and its costs are covered with its own income.26. The legal instrument that regulates the cooperatives must make sure that this organization, as form of social property, is not sold or otherwise assigned in ownership to any other cooperative or any non-State organization or any natural person.27. A cooperative maintains contractual relations with other cooperatives, companies, State-funded entities and other non-State organizations. After satisfying its commitment with the State, the cooperative may pursue sales operations free from intermediaries and in accordance with the business activity it is authorized to perform.28. Subject to compliance with the appropriate laws and after observance of its tax and contribution obligations, each cooperative determines the income payable to its employees and the distribution of its profits.29. Grade 2 cooperatives shall be formed and the partners of which shall be Grade 1 cooperatives. A Grade 2 Cooperative shall represent a separate legal person that owns assets. Th","PeriodicalId":254309,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Cuban Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115528639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-07-01DOI: 10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0189
Enrique Ávila López
El futuro es hoy (2009) is a short 35-minute documentary based on an idea, photography and direction of Sandra Gomez (1976-) shot in Havana between 2006 and 2008. It is the second documentary by this young director graduated from the International School of Film and Television in Havana (2004), who moved to Zurich (Switzerland), where she has been living since 2005. It is in Switzerland where, thanks to the producer Peacock Film, Sandra receives funding for her films. Therefore, this is a film that has not been financed by the Cuban government, but which has won awards in Cuba as well as receiving international awards.1 Significantly, Sandra's cinema seems to be born with a vocation to highlight what Cuban and cubanidad mean in Cuba today.2In her first documentary Las camas solas (14 minutes, 2006), her commitment is already evident, with its obvious sensitivity to the current reality of Havana, which is portrayed through a dismal episode in the recent history of the capital - the devastation of Hurricane Ivan in 2004. The catastrophe caused the Cuban government to shelter many families as a result of the damage, leaving dilapidated buildings and 'single beds', as the title poetically suggests. However, Mother Nature does not seem to be the only culprit in the state of deterioration that is Havana and Cuba in general. Starting, perhaps ironically, using a natural accident, the beauty of this film lies in the ability of Gomez to introduce a sad and dilapidated city. The urban area of Havana is portrayed in a way that evokes tears not only because of the hurricane but unfortunately mostly, and here comes the political message, because of the evident need for an urban renewal that was claimed in the 1960s as one of the specific projects of the Cuban revolution, but is yet to come. Within this historical context, the attempt to enact a ruined city goes beyond the purely aesthetic: the poetics of Las camas solas contains a political message, albeit initially, ambiguous.Using as a pretext the destructive effects of Hurricane Ivan, Las camas solas shows a social attitude committed to portraying the lack of new homes in Havana. However, Sandra's commitment is in principle ambivalent. On one hand, it could be argued that Hurricane Ivan is read as not just an accident of nature but rather it symbolises a Cuban government that comes to act as a permanent cyclone, generating sorrow and distress. This position would be an example of the group of Cuban intellectuals, already mentioned by the scholar Linda Howe, who are not afraid to examine the ways in which government restrictions have distorted 'our understanding of post-revolutionary Cuban cultural history' (Howe 2004: 14).However, the work of Sandra Gomez could also be interpreted through a Marxist prism: this is a documentary that represents another case of artistic freedom, coinciding with utopian values promoted by the Revolution and, in this particular case, by the Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Ar
《El futuro es hoy》(2009)是一部35分钟的纪录片,以桑德拉·戈麦斯(1976-)的创意、摄影和导演为基础,于2006年至2008年在哈瓦那拍摄。这是这位毕业于哈瓦那国际电影电视学院(2004)的年轻导演的第二部纪录片,她从2005年搬到了瑞士苏黎世,并一直生活在那里。正是在瑞士,多亏了制片人孔雀电影公司,桑德拉获得了拍摄电影的资金。因此,这是一部不是由古巴政府资助的电影,但它在古巴获得了奖项,并获得了国际奖项值得注意的是,桑德拉的电影似乎生来就有一种使命,即突出古巴人和古巴人在今天的古巴意味着什么。在她的第一部纪录片Las camas solas(14分钟,2006年)中,她的承诺已经很明显了,它对哈瓦那当前的现实有着明显的敏感性,通过首都最近历史上的一个悲惨事件- 2004年伊万飓风的破坏来描绘。这场灾难导致古巴政府为许多家庭提供了避难所,留下了破败的建筑和“单人床”,正如标题所暗示的那样。然而,自然母亲似乎并不是哈瓦那和古巴整体状况恶化的唯一罪魁祸首。也许具有讽刺意味的是,这部电影以一场自然事故为开端,其美妙之处在于戈麦斯介绍了一个悲伤而破败的城市。哈瓦那市区的描绘方式令人流泪,不仅是因为飓风,更不幸的是,这里有政治信息,因为明显需要城市更新,这在20世纪60年代被称为古巴革命的具体项目之一,但尚未实现。在这样的历史背景下,试图塑造一座被摧毁的城市超越了纯粹的审美:Las camas solas的诗学包含了一种政治信息,尽管最初是模糊的。Las camas solas以伊万飓风的破坏性影响为借口,展示了一种致力于描绘哈瓦那缺乏新住房的社会态度。然而,桑德拉的承诺在原则上是矛盾的。一方面,人们可能会认为,飓风伊万不仅被解读为大自然的意外,而且象征着古巴政府将成为一场永久的飓风,制造悲伤和痛苦。这一立场是古巴知识分子群体的一个例子,学者Linda Howe已经提到过,他们不害怕检查政府限制扭曲了“我们对革命后古巴文化史的理解”的方式(Howe 2004: 14)。然而,桑德拉·戈麦斯的作品也可以通过马克思主义的棱镜来解读:这是一部代表艺术自由的另一个案例的纪录片,与革命所倡导的乌托邦价值观相吻合,在这个特殊的案例中,古巴电影艺术与工业协会(ICAIC)由古巴政府于1959年成立。自20世纪60年代以来,ICAIC一直在推广包括对革命许多方面的批评的电影。正如评论家约翰·赫斯(John Hess)所指出的,这将是许多古巴电影继续吸引古巴国内外观众的原因(赫斯1999:207)。本文将试图揭示桑德拉·戈麦斯作品中的承诺。具体来说,本文着重分析了纪录片《我的未来》,认为这部纪录片具有很强的诗意感性,它向我们展示了一个残酷的现实,但同时又很敏感。主要结论是,桑德拉·戈麦斯是一位古巴电影人,能够通过高度个人化的拍摄方式,使观众对诗意的真理敏感,其特点是超越单纯的批评,成为她那个时代的电影制片人兼作家。《El futuro es hoy》一开始的音乐似乎是在大声呼救,但没有明确表达出来。...
{"title":"El Futuro Es Hoy (2009): A Poetic Look at Generation Y or 90","authors":"Enrique Ávila López","doi":"10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0189","url":null,"abstract":"El futuro es hoy (2009) is a short 35-minute documentary based on an idea, photography and direction of Sandra Gomez (1976-) shot in Havana between 2006 and 2008. It is the second documentary by this young director graduated from the International School of Film and Television in Havana (2004), who moved to Zurich (Switzerland), where she has been living since 2005. It is in Switzerland where, thanks to the producer Peacock Film, Sandra receives funding for her films. Therefore, this is a film that has not been financed by the Cuban government, but which has won awards in Cuba as well as receiving international awards.1 Significantly, Sandra's cinema seems to be born with a vocation to highlight what Cuban and cubanidad mean in Cuba today.2In her first documentary Las camas solas (14 minutes, 2006), her commitment is already evident, with its obvious sensitivity to the current reality of Havana, which is portrayed through a dismal episode in the recent history of the capital - the devastation of Hurricane Ivan in 2004. The catastrophe caused the Cuban government to shelter many families as a result of the damage, leaving dilapidated buildings and 'single beds', as the title poetically suggests. However, Mother Nature does not seem to be the only culprit in the state of deterioration that is Havana and Cuba in general. Starting, perhaps ironically, using a natural accident, the beauty of this film lies in the ability of Gomez to introduce a sad and dilapidated city. The urban area of Havana is portrayed in a way that evokes tears not only because of the hurricane but unfortunately mostly, and here comes the political message, because of the evident need for an urban renewal that was claimed in the 1960s as one of the specific projects of the Cuban revolution, but is yet to come. Within this historical context, the attempt to enact a ruined city goes beyond the purely aesthetic: the poetics of Las camas solas contains a political message, albeit initially, ambiguous.Using as a pretext the destructive effects of Hurricane Ivan, Las camas solas shows a social attitude committed to portraying the lack of new homes in Havana. However, Sandra's commitment is in principle ambivalent. On one hand, it could be argued that Hurricane Ivan is read as not just an accident of nature but rather it symbolises a Cuban government that comes to act as a permanent cyclone, generating sorrow and distress. This position would be an example of the group of Cuban intellectuals, already mentioned by the scholar Linda Howe, who are not afraid to examine the ways in which government restrictions have distorted 'our understanding of post-revolutionary Cuban cultural history' (Howe 2004: 14).However, the work of Sandra Gomez could also be interpreted through a Marxist prism: this is a documentary that represents another case of artistic freedom, coinciding with utopian values promoted by the Revolution and, in this particular case, by the Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Ar","PeriodicalId":254309,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Cuban Studies","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129180388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-07-01DOI: 10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0157
Alessandro Badella
Promoting Democracy and the 'Two Level Game'Another answer to our main question - Why is the US promoting democracy abroad? - is based on the bi-univocal relationship between US foreign policy and internal and electoral dynamics. After the Cold War, the collapse of a powerful external enemy (the Soviet Union) brought a redefinition of the policy-making process at an internal level: the mutated international scenario, public opinion, Congress and the groups of pressure could now influence US policy in the global arena (Maynes 1990). After 1989, the 'costs' promoting democracy ebbed: during the Cold War, it was hazardous to abandon US-friendly authoritarian and military regimes in the name of human rights (with the risk of paying a high prime in geopolitical terms). However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, those 'costs' could now be perceived as minimal. As Holsti (2000: 152) pointed out,not only were the potential costs associated with expanding democracy significantly reduced, but this goal also seemed to offer a unifying focus for American foreign policy ... In short, this has appeared to be a foreign policy goal that not only promised a very favourable risk-reward ratio abroad, but that also offered the promise of rich domestic political dividends.Actually, American public opinion never looked at democracy promotion with interest and enthusiasm (Holsti 2000). In particular, after the invasion of Iraq, the American people started to associate democracy promotion with the high costs of the global war on terrorism and the 'Bush doctrine' in terms of economic resources and lives lost (Tures 2007).In the post-Cold War world, ethnic lobbying has become a distinguishing feature in the construction of US foreign policy: ethnic or national groups could now influence the foreign policy-making process (Shain 1995). The existing literature about the condition of successful influence of ethnic groups presents several factors: the organisational strength of the group, and the political unification, and power of mobilisation (Ahrari 1987; Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Said 1981; Watanabe 1984); the numerical and electoral significance of the ethnic group (Ambrosio 2002; Haney and Vanderbush 1999); the cultural affinity with the broader US population (Said 1981; Uslaner 2004; Watanabe 1984) and the ideological and strategic compatibility and affinity with US geopolitical views (Arnson and Brenner 1993: 214; Dent 1995; Trice 1976; Watanabe 1984). The Cuban community in the US had the possibility and the capability to develop all the above-mentioned elements (Haney and Vanderbush 1999).The results were a strong political influence over the process of foreign policy making. Since the 1980s, Cuban-American constituencies in Florida, and partly in New Jersey, became Cuban political citadels and 'no aspirant for local, state or national office could ignore the ethnic vote' (Morley and McGillion 2002: 11). In that decade, Cuban-Americans won important mayoral an
我们主要问题的另一个答案是——为什么美国要在国外推广民主?——基于美国外交政策与国内和选举动态之间的双重关系。冷战结束后,一个强大的外部敌人(苏联)的崩溃带来了对内部决策过程的重新定义:突变的国际形势、公众舆论、国会和压力集团现在可以影响美国在全球舞台上的政策(Maynes 1990)。1989年之后,促进民主的“成本”下降了:在冷战期间,以人权的名义放弃对美国友好的独裁和军事政权是危险的(在地缘政治方面有付出高昂代价的风险)。然而,在苏联解体后,这些“成本”现在可能被认为是最小的。正如霍尔斯蒂(2000:152)所指出的那样,不仅与扩大民主相关的潜在成本大大降低,而且这一目标似乎也为美国外交政策提供了一个统一的焦点……简而言之,这似乎是一个外交政策目标,它不仅承诺在国外获得非常有利的风险回报比,而且还承诺在国内获得丰厚的政治红利。实际上,美国公众舆论从来没有以兴趣和热情看待民主推广(Holsti 2000)。特别是,在入侵伊拉克之后,美国人民开始将民主推广与全球反恐战争的高昂成本以及经济资源和生命损失方面的“布什主义”联系在一起(Tures 2007)。在后冷战时代,种族游说已经成为美国外交政策构建的一个显著特征:种族或民族团体现在可以影响外交政策制定过程(Shain 1995)。现有的关于族群成功影响条件的文献提出了几个因素:群体的组织力量、政治统一和动员力量(Ahrari 1987;Haney and Vanderbush 1999;说1981;渡边1984);少数民族的数量和选举意义(Ambrosio 2002;Haney and Vanderbush 1999);与更广泛的美国人口的文化亲和力(Said 1981;Uslaner 2004;Watanabe 1984)以及与美国地缘政治观点的意识形态和战略兼容性和亲和力(Arnson and Brenner 1993: 214;减少1995;吊起1976;渡边1984)。在美国的古巴人社区有可能也有能力发展上述所有要素(Haney and Vanderbush 1999)。其结果是对外交政策制定过程产生了强大的政治影响。自20世纪80年代以来,佛罗里达州的古巴裔美国人选区,以及新泽西州的部分地区,成为古巴人的政治堡垒,“没有一个有志于担任地方、州或国家公职的人可以忽视少数民族的投票”(莫利和麦克吉里昂2002:11)。在这十年中,古巴裔美国人赢得了迈阿密和佛罗里达重要的市长和代表职位(Perez 1992: 102-103)。正如波特斯(2005:193)指出的那样,“许多流亡者……似乎相信他们是在古巴而不是在美国当选的,他们可以据此行事。”在20世纪90年代,对美国机构的渗透成功完成,古巴强硬派直接进入国会,反对克林顿对古巴的外交政策(Haney and Vanderbush 1999: 345;Vanderbush 2009: 299-300)。古巴裔美国人全国基金会(CANF)也将其游说活动扩大到非古巴国会议员(Calvo和Delercq 2000: 69-70)。“古巴问题”代表了一场“两级博弈”(LeoGrande 1998),因此,对卡斯特罗过于温和意味着受到古巴裔美国选民的“惩罚”:以这种方式,美古关系进入了国家政治竞争(Eckstein 2009: 112-9;LeoGrande 1998)。“共生关系”和“利益与世界观的趋同”(Fernandez 1987: 116;Moore 2002: 86)在冷战期间形成并维持到20世纪90年代的白宫与古巴少数民族之间的关系,在促进民主领域也发挥了重要作用。…
{"title":"American Hýbris: 1 Us Democracy Promotion in Cuba after the Cold War - Part 2","authors":"Alessandro Badella","doi":"10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13169/INTEJCUBASTUD.6.2.0157","url":null,"abstract":"Promoting Democracy and the 'Two Level Game'Another answer to our main question - Why is the US promoting democracy abroad? - is based on the bi-univocal relationship between US foreign policy and internal and electoral dynamics. After the Cold War, the collapse of a powerful external enemy (the Soviet Union) brought a redefinition of the policy-making process at an internal level: the mutated international scenario, public opinion, Congress and the groups of pressure could now influence US policy in the global arena (Maynes 1990). After 1989, the 'costs' promoting democracy ebbed: during the Cold War, it was hazardous to abandon US-friendly authoritarian and military regimes in the name of human rights (with the risk of paying a high prime in geopolitical terms). However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, those 'costs' could now be perceived as minimal. As Holsti (2000: 152) pointed out,not only were the potential costs associated with expanding democracy significantly reduced, but this goal also seemed to offer a unifying focus for American foreign policy ... In short, this has appeared to be a foreign policy goal that not only promised a very favourable risk-reward ratio abroad, but that also offered the promise of rich domestic political dividends.Actually, American public opinion never looked at democracy promotion with interest and enthusiasm (Holsti 2000). In particular, after the invasion of Iraq, the American people started to associate democracy promotion with the high costs of the global war on terrorism and the 'Bush doctrine' in terms of economic resources and lives lost (Tures 2007).In the post-Cold War world, ethnic lobbying has become a distinguishing feature in the construction of US foreign policy: ethnic or national groups could now influence the foreign policy-making process (Shain 1995). The existing literature about the condition of successful influence of ethnic groups presents several factors: the organisational strength of the group, and the political unification, and power of mobilisation (Ahrari 1987; Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Said 1981; Watanabe 1984); the numerical and electoral significance of the ethnic group (Ambrosio 2002; Haney and Vanderbush 1999); the cultural affinity with the broader US population (Said 1981; Uslaner 2004; Watanabe 1984) and the ideological and strategic compatibility and affinity with US geopolitical views (Arnson and Brenner 1993: 214; Dent 1995; Trice 1976; Watanabe 1984). The Cuban community in the US had the possibility and the capability to develop all the above-mentioned elements (Haney and Vanderbush 1999).The results were a strong political influence over the process of foreign policy making. Since the 1980s, Cuban-American constituencies in Florida, and partly in New Jersey, became Cuban political citadels and 'no aspirant for local, state or national office could ignore the ethnic vote' (Morley and McGillion 2002: 11). In that decade, Cuban-Americans won important mayoral an","PeriodicalId":254309,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Cuban Studies","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126824805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}