Pub Date : 1937-10-01DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.48.1.2989300
H. Kelsen
I -O F ALL the activities of the mind on which the Aristotelian philosophy has exercised its influence throughout the last two thousand years, on none has the teaching of the Stagira sage acted so directly and so decisively as on ethical and political theory-an influence still apparent at the present day. The almost divine authority which Aristotle enjoyed in the sphere of the natural sciences has long since disappeared; his logic, once admired as the emanation of absolute truth, has been deposed, though only a few generations ago, from its hitherto commanding position. But the profound respect accorded to his Ethics and Politics remains undiminished. Their influence on the thought of our time can scarcely be overestimated. Modern scientific treatments of the problems of a moral world-order and of a juridical state community still, in very great measure, betray the stamp of the Aristotelian system. But in that system Aristotle's Ethics and Politics are essentially connected with his Metaphysics." And thus it is the Metaphysics which appears as the foundation of the moral system of values, whether these values be knowingly accepted in
{"title":"The Philosophy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy","authors":"H. Kelsen","doi":"10.1086/intejethi.48.1.2989300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.48.1.2989300","url":null,"abstract":"I -O F ALL the activities of the mind on which the Aristotelian philosophy has exercised its influence throughout the last two thousand years, on none has the teaching of the Stagira sage acted so directly and so decisively as on ethical and political theory-an influence still apparent at the present day. The almost divine authority which Aristotle enjoyed in the sphere of the natural sciences has long since disappeared; his logic, once admired as the emanation of absolute truth, has been deposed, though only a few generations ago, from its hitherto commanding position. But the profound respect accorded to his Ethics and Politics remains undiminished. Their influence on the thought of our time can scarcely be overestimated. Modern scientific treatments of the problems of a moral world-order and of a juridical state community still, in very great measure, betray the stamp of the Aristotelian system. But in that system Aristotle's Ethics and Politics are essentially connected with his Metaphysics.\" And thus it is the Metaphysics which appears as the foundation of the moral system of values, whether these values be knowingly accepted in","PeriodicalId":346392,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Ethics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1937-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130124659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1937-10-01DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.48.1.2989301
T. V. Smith, G. C. Routt
N i ' OT since Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legislation has there appeared in English a study of legislation so pretentious as this four-volume work of the Honorable Robert Luce. Yet this comparison might well be odious to both authors. Bentham was concerned, as the title of his work shows, almost exclusively with principles: not only of legislation but also, if not indeed primarily, of morals. His work was put inside a single volume,was pungently even dogmatically written, was sectarian in point of view (hedonic), and was done almost deductively from beginning to end. In a word, Bentham's work was a philosophy of legislation. Mr. Luce's work is not a philosophy but a manual (though published under the title of "Science of Legislation"). True, it is loosejointed in scope (four large volumes), it is free-associational in method, it is eclectic in outlook, it is anecdotal in its inditement But it remains a manual-a manual deferential to history and tolerant of variety but preoccupied primarily with practice. (Would that every author furnished his manual with as complete an index as each volume here has!). Unlike Bentham's work, this comprehensive discussion is focused on the legislative arena: its counsels are redolent of debate (seeing I Four volumes by Robert Luce. Boston and New York: Houghton Miffin Co. Reference is made to the volumes in the following order: I. Legislative Procedure: Parliamentary Practices and the Course of Business in the Framing of Statutes. I922. Pp. vi+628. $5.00. II. Legislative Assemblies: Their Framework, Make-up, Character, Characteristics, Habits, and Manners. I924. Pp. vi+69i. $6.oo. III. Legislative Principles: The History and Theory of Lawmaking by Representative Government. I930. Pp. vi+667. $6.oo. IV. Legislative Problems: Development, Status, and Trend of the Treatment and Exercise of Lawmaking Powers. I935. Pp. vi+762. $6.oo.
自从边沁的《道德与立法原则》以来，英语中还没有出现过像尊敬的罗伯特·卢斯的这部四卷本的立法研究如此自命不凡的著作。然而，这种比较可能会让两位作者都感到厌恶。边沁所关注的，正如他著作的标题所示，几乎完全是原则:不仅是立法原则，而且，如果不是主要原则，也是道德原则。他的作品被放在一卷书里，写得辛辣甚至武断，观点宗派(享乐主义)，从头到尾几乎都是演绎的。总之，边沁的著作是一种立法哲学。卢斯先生的著作不是哲学，而是一本手册(尽管以“立法科学”的名义出版)。的确，它在范围上是松散的(四卷)，在方法上是自由结合的，在观点上是折衷的，在写作上是轶事的，但它仍然是一本手册——一本尊重历史，容忍多样性，但主要关注实践的手册。(但愿每一位作者在他的手册里都有像这里的每一卷一样完整的索引!)与边沁的著作不同，这本全面的讨论集中在立法领域:它的建议充满了辩论的味道(参见罗伯特·卢斯的四卷书)。波士顿和纽约:霍顿米芬公司。参考这些卷按以下顺序:1 .立法程序:制定法规中的议会实践和业务过程。I922。Pp. vi + 628。5.00美元。2立法会议:它们的框架、组成、特征、特点、习惯和礼仪。I924。我Pp. vi + 69。oo 6.美元。3立法原则:代议制政府立法的历史与理论。I930。Pp. vi + 667。oo 6.美元。四、立法问题:立法权待遇与行使的发展、现状与趋势。I935。Pp. vi + 762。oo 6.美元。
{"title":"A Legislator Looks at Legislation","authors":"T. V. Smith, G. C. Routt","doi":"10.1086/intejethi.48.1.2989301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.48.1.2989301","url":null,"abstract":"N i ' OT since Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legislation has there appeared in English a study of legislation so pretentious as this four-volume work of the Honorable Robert Luce. Yet this comparison might well be odious to both authors. Bentham was concerned, as the title of his work shows, almost exclusively with principles: not only of legislation but also, if not indeed primarily, of morals. His work was put inside a single volume,was pungently even dogmatically written, was sectarian in point of view (hedonic), and was done almost deductively from beginning to end. In a word, Bentham's work was a philosophy of legislation. Mr. Luce's work is not a philosophy but a manual (though published under the title of \"Science of Legislation\"). True, it is loosejointed in scope (four large volumes), it is free-associational in method, it is eclectic in outlook, it is anecdotal in its inditement But it remains a manual-a manual deferential to history and tolerant of variety but preoccupied primarily with practice. (Would that every author furnished his manual with as complete an index as each volume here has!). Unlike Bentham's work, this comprehensive discussion is focused on the legislative arena: its counsels are redolent of debate (seeing I Four volumes by Robert Luce. Boston and New York: Houghton Miffin Co. Reference is made to the volumes in the following order: I. Legislative Procedure: Parliamentary Practices and the Course of Business in the Framing of Statutes. I922. Pp. vi+628. $5.00. II. Legislative Assemblies: Their Framework, Make-up, Character, Characteristics, Habits, and Manners. I924. Pp. vi+69i. $6.oo. III. Legislative Principles: The History and Theory of Lawmaking by Representative Government. I930. Pp. vi+667. $6.oo. IV. Legislative Problems: Development, Status, and Trend of the Treatment and Exercise of Lawmaking Powers. I935. Pp. vi+762. $6.oo.","PeriodicalId":346392,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Ethics","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1937-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133185287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1937-10-01DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.48.1.2989312
D. Emmet, Roman Catholicism
leianism as "vicious intellectualism" is clearly unfair. Bradley and Bergson both criticize the categories of science as partial viewpoints and reject the view that the absolute is a logical construction. Both look for a means of apprehending a reality which is an individual unity and includes feeling. So Bergson's "intuition" is fruitfully compared with Bradley's "higher immediacy." Bergson comes out of the comparison best in Mr. Loomba's eyes. This is partly because of his deeper appreciation of life and growth. Bradley's absolute became a static "block universe." But this, Mr. Loomba interestingly urges, is not a necessary consequence of Bradley's metaphysical attitude, so much as conditioned by the philosophic tradition in which he stood. His absolute is really the immediate collective experience of the multiplicity of appearances, which in effect he considers as an ideal and so renders static. So much we may grant on Bergson's side. But on the other counts, unlike Mr. Loomba, we are inclined to give higher marks to Bradley. Bergson believes that his "intuition" can be completely realized-that we can achieve a form of thought which dispenses altogether with symbols. Bradley is to the end more sceptical-we can have partial experience of such Scientia intuitive, but in its fulness it is o068 Kr'frov TOP
{"title":"Shorter Notices","authors":"D. Emmet, Roman Catholicism","doi":"10.1086/intejethi.48.1.2989312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.48.1.2989312","url":null,"abstract":"leianism as \"vicious intellectualism\" is clearly unfair. Bradley and Bergson both criticize the categories of science as partial viewpoints and reject the view that the absolute is a logical construction. Both look for a means of apprehending a reality which is an individual unity and includes feeling. So Bergson's \"intuition\" is fruitfully compared with Bradley's \"higher immediacy.\" Bergson comes out of the comparison best in Mr. Loomba's eyes. This is partly because of his deeper appreciation of life and growth. Bradley's absolute became a static \"block universe.\" But this, Mr. Loomba interestingly urges, is not a necessary consequence of Bradley's metaphysical attitude, so much as conditioned by the philosophic tradition in which he stood. His absolute is really the immediate collective experience of the multiplicity of appearances, which in effect he considers as an ideal and so renders static. So much we may grant on Bergson's side. But on the other counts, unlike Mr. Loomba, we are inclined to give higher marks to Bradley. Bergson believes that his \"intuition\" can be completely realized-that we can achieve a form of thought which dispenses altogether with symbols. Bradley is to the end more sceptical-we can have partial experience of such Scientia intuitive, but in its fulness it is o068 Kr'frov TOP","PeriodicalId":346392,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Ethics","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1937-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117160968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1937-07-01DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989368
T H E psychology of cultural antipathies, often erroneously miscalled racial prejudices, while subtle, is not difficult to understand once the true nature of culture and its relationship to personality is fully grasped. The almost infinite number of behavior patterns which the human organism is capable of forming under the guidance of a rich cultural background is only less amazing than the variety of organization which these patterns may assume. Thus, although we recognize as fellow-humans the products of strange cultures, for we recognize familiar behavior patterns in them, nevertheless they seem slightly out of focus to us because their organization is strange. We do not feel completely at home with members of other cultures, and this is the basic psychological substratum for our fears and antipathies. The old idea that personality was something inherent within the organism which was simply educed by outer surroundings has given way, under the impact of the analyses of men like Baldwin, Cooley, Dewey, Mead, and Bernard, to a more socialized theory in which personality is seen to lie to a great degree in our responses to the people and things about us. According to this view, personality consists in a complex set of relationships between the organism and its setting. The people and things which surround us contribute as much to our personalities as we do, and any violent truncation of these outer
{"title":"An Analysis of Jewish Culture","authors":"","doi":"10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989368","url":null,"abstract":"T H E psychology of cultural antipathies, often erroneously miscalled racial prejudices, while subtle, is not difficult to understand once the true nature of culture and its relationship to personality is fully grasped. The almost infinite number of behavior patterns which the human organism is capable of forming under the guidance of a rich cultural background is only less amazing than the variety of organization which these patterns may assume. Thus, although we recognize as fellow-humans the products of strange cultures, for we recognize familiar behavior patterns in them, nevertheless they seem slightly out of focus to us because their organization is strange. We do not feel completely at home with members of other cultures, and this is the basic psychological substratum for our fears and antipathies. The old idea that personality was something inherent within the organism which was simply educed by outer surroundings has given way, under the impact of the analyses of men like Baldwin, Cooley, Dewey, Mead, and Bernard, to a more socialized theory in which personality is seen to lie to a great degree in our responses to the people and things about us. According to this view, personality consists in a complex set of relationships between the organism and its setting. The people and things which surround us contribute as much to our personalities as we do, and any violent truncation of these outer","PeriodicalId":346392,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Ethics","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1937-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130772945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1937-07-01DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989370
E. W. Strong
5 T WH ETHER in sympathy or antipathy, there are A/1I many philosophers who have been concerned with V Professor Dewey's treatment of metaphysics. For Dewey, the role of philosophy as criticism is a "straight and narrow path." While philosophical discourse partakes of literary discourse, its task is restricted to analysis and evaluation. Not thus restricted are the arts of literary discourse, for, as Dewey writes, "they have a freer office to perform-to perpetuate, enhance and vivify in imagination the natural goods; ." The restriction of philosophy to the task of criticism entails the casting-out of cosmological system-making. Metaphysics is concerned solely with a description of the generic traits of existence. A descriptive naturalism notes and registers, detects and defines, the "inextricable mixture of stability and uncertainty" displayed by events in their histories. Such a metaphysics is a "preliminary outline of the field of criticism, whose chief import is to afford understanding of the necessity and nature of the office of intelligence." The preliminary outline is no ultimate explanation of anything. No theology or superscience is admitted as a legitimate conversion into a cosmological status of those traits that are precious to us. The ontologically descriptive is not followed by the cosmologically prescriptive. Dewey, in his metaphysics, sets before us the conditions of diversity and mutability which challenge men but offers us no cosmic security, guidance, or solace. Philosophy as criticism looks to the derivations, contexts, and references of our beliefs, meanings, and values and recommends intelligence to provide instruments of choice and control.
{"title":"Metaphors and Metaphysics","authors":"E. W. Strong","doi":"10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989370","url":null,"abstract":"5 T WH ETHER in sympathy or antipathy, there are A/1I many philosophers who have been concerned with V Professor Dewey's treatment of metaphysics. For Dewey, the role of philosophy as criticism is a \"straight and narrow path.\" While philosophical discourse partakes of literary discourse, its task is restricted to analysis and evaluation. Not thus restricted are the arts of literary discourse, for, as Dewey writes, \"they have a freer office to perform-to perpetuate, enhance and vivify in imagination the natural goods; .\" The restriction of philosophy to the task of criticism entails the casting-out of cosmological system-making. Metaphysics is concerned solely with a description of the generic traits of existence. A descriptive naturalism notes and registers, detects and defines, the \"inextricable mixture of stability and uncertainty\" displayed by events in their histories. Such a metaphysics is a \"preliminary outline of the field of criticism, whose chief import is to afford understanding of the necessity and nature of the office of intelligence.\" The preliminary outline is no ultimate explanation of anything. No theology or superscience is admitted as a legitimate conversion into a cosmological status of those traits that are precious to us. The ontologically descriptive is not followed by the cosmologically prescriptive. Dewey, in his metaphysics, sets before us the conditions of diversity and mutability which challenge men but offers us no cosmic security, guidance, or solace. Philosophy as criticism looks to the derivations, contexts, and references of our beliefs, meanings, and values and recommends intelligence to provide instruments of choice and control.","PeriodicalId":346392,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Ethics","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1937-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133520601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1937-07-01DOI: 10.1086/INTEJETHI.47.4.2989379
H. Larrabee
{"title":"The If's and Ought's of Ethics. Cecil de Boer","authors":"H. Larrabee","doi":"10.1086/INTEJETHI.47.4.2989379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/INTEJETHI.47.4.2989379","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":346392,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Ethics","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1937-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128969387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1937-07-01DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989371
Percy Hughes
AS WE turn the pages of a well-planned newspaper we see that in modern life certain activities are so segregated as to achieve some measure of autotelic and autonomous organization: for instance, medicine, religion, industry, art, science, government, education, sport, etc. In democratic societies these segregations are more complete, at least in the negative sense that no external influence presumes in general to dictate. "Sport," for example, goes its way with but sporadic interference from medicine, education, religion, or government. But at present, within each such field of segregation, one finds little positive insight into the whole range of the activities that are involved, and of the several distinct, indispensable factors that enter into the situation, of which each calls for development peculiar to itself. So we see that in religion, beside the religion of the "churches," we must recognize that secular, political, and theocratic religion all enter into every concrete situation where a religious problem arises.' Failure to recognize this essential manifoldness of the religious problem gives rise to moralizing and contention rather than to fresh vision and inspired achievement. Similarly in matters of sport we see a round condemnation of procedures in one phase of sport in terms of criteria applicable only to another; while there is lacking such broad and discriminating cultivation of sport in all its phases as most diversifies, invigorates, and gladdens life. Surveys of each such field of segregated activities are one chief function of ethical study, so that in making a practical decision we may do so with some vision of the entire field within which that decision will produce effects. All such segregations do indeed interact, and a broader survey will bring this interaction into clearer view. First, however, we need more adequate surveys than we now have of each segregation, for the purpose of winning for every indispensable factor therein due recognition and full development. In every such segregation we must first appreciate that factor of feeling
{"title":"Sport","authors":"Percy Hughes","doi":"10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989371","url":null,"abstract":"AS WE turn the pages of a well-planned newspaper we see that in modern life certain activities are so segregated as to achieve some measure of autotelic and autonomous organization: for instance, medicine, religion, industry, art, science, government, education, sport, etc. In democratic societies these segregations are more complete, at least in the negative sense that no external influence presumes in general to dictate. \"Sport,\" for example, goes its way with but sporadic interference from medicine, education, religion, or government. But at present, within each such field of segregation, one finds little positive insight into the whole range of the activities that are involved, and of the several distinct, indispensable factors that enter into the situation, of which each calls for development peculiar to itself. So we see that in religion, beside the religion of the \"churches,\" we must recognize that secular, political, and theocratic religion all enter into every concrete situation where a religious problem arises.' Failure to recognize this essential manifoldness of the religious problem gives rise to moralizing and contention rather than to fresh vision and inspired achievement. Similarly in matters of sport we see a round condemnation of procedures in one phase of sport in terms of criteria applicable only to another; while there is lacking such broad and discriminating cultivation of sport in all its phases as most diversifies, invigorates, and gladdens life. Surveys of each such field of segregated activities are one chief function of ethical study, so that in making a practical decision we may do so with some vision of the entire field within which that decision will produce effects. All such segregations do indeed interact, and a broader survey will bring this interaction into clearer view. First, however, we need more adequate surveys than we now have of each segregation, for the purpose of winning for every indispensable factor therein due recognition and full development. In every such segregation we must first appreciate that factor of feeling","PeriodicalId":346392,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Ethics","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1937-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114419111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1937-07-01DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989369
A. E. Avey
S KEPTICISM is the characteristic mark of the thinking of the present age on moral questions. Whatever pretensions are made to the validity of the criticism of human conduct, it still remains that these are pretensions. In practice we find fault with one another, accuse our fellows of living on a low level of existence, and berate the social standards of the day. Yet when we undertake deliberately and seriously to point out the objective principles of conduct which we are presupposing in our judgments, and to demonstrate why they are objective and applicable to the person criticized, we begin to hedge and to compromise, making fatal concession to the skeptic and admitting that after all it is a matter of custom, of personal conviction, or of some other merely individual standard. On the part of the common man there is no more expressive representation of this skepticism than the challenge so often heard in the face of criticism: "That's what you think." If we turn to literary authority, we find the word of Shakespeare: "There's nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so." Or, if we seek more orthodox authority, we may quote even Paul's liberal advice to the Corinthians: "If one of them that believe not biddeth you to a feast, and ye are disposed to go; whatever is set before you, eat, asking no question for conscience' sake" (I Cor. IO: 27). In the detailed study of the history of morals we have Westermarck's well-known account. And nearer home, from the collaboration of a group of philosophers a few years ago, this statement: To the arguments of the complete moral skeptic, it must be admitted, there can be made no conclusive and irrefutable reply. But neither can
{"title":"Moral Skepticism and the Way of Escape","authors":"A. E. Avey","doi":"10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989369","url":null,"abstract":"S KEPTICISM is the characteristic mark of the thinking of the present age on moral questions. Whatever pretensions are made to the validity of the criticism of human conduct, it still remains that these are pretensions. In practice we find fault with one another, accuse our fellows of living on a low level of existence, and berate the social standards of the day. Yet when we undertake deliberately and seriously to point out the objective principles of conduct which we are presupposing in our judgments, and to demonstrate why they are objective and applicable to the person criticized, we begin to hedge and to compromise, making fatal concession to the skeptic and admitting that after all it is a matter of custom, of personal conviction, or of some other merely individual standard. On the part of the common man there is no more expressive representation of this skepticism than the challenge so often heard in the face of criticism: \"That's what you think.\" If we turn to literary authority, we find the word of Shakespeare: \"There's nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so.\" Or, if we seek more orthodox authority, we may quote even Paul's liberal advice to the Corinthians: \"If one of them that believe not biddeth you to a feast, and ye are disposed to go; whatever is set before you, eat, asking no question for conscience' sake\" (I Cor. IO: 27). In the detailed study of the history of morals we have Westermarck's well-known account. And nearer home, from the collaboration of a group of philosophers a few years ago, this statement: To the arguments of the complete moral skeptic, it must be admitted, there can be made no conclusive and irrefutable reply. But neither can","PeriodicalId":346392,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Ethics","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1937-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126748645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1937-07-01DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989367
T. V. Smith
O F THE three great stages for the theater of life, two body forth the distinctively human show. First, however, there is the more elementary behavior of manthe stage of animal urgency. Then there is action guided by ends-the stage of political endeavor. Finally, there is contemplation of ideals or of whatever else-the stage of philosophic wonder and worth. Our present preoccupation is with the political and the philosophic. The lower stage of purely animal behavior is here remarked for perspective and as a reminder that the human spirit has no final immunity from the heats of body and the fumes of earth. The vocation of man advances through political sublimation of animal urgency to contemplation as catharsis for action, political or animal. Without prejudging other means than the natural for this advance, let us focus attention upon man's predicament at its worst to see whether ideal potencies of real promise may not lie
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Pub Date : 1937-07-01DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.47.4.2989384
Shorter Notices, Recht Und Sittlichkeit, By Rudolf Laun, Berlin Julius Springer
The author accepts Kant's distinction between being and ought. Law as a science must be either a natural science having nothing to do with duty and ought or a cultural science whose main concerns are judgments of value. The positivistic conception of law is mistaken. For it is impossible to derive right from might, duty from force, ought from must. The final ground of the value judgments of law is discovered in the autonomous experience of a concrete ought. Kant needs to be corrected on two counts: (i) His distinction between a rule of morality as a categorical and a rule of law as a hypothetical imperative needs to be formulated more sharply. (2) An abstract moral law in Kant's sense cannot be discovered anywhere in experience. Kant's hypothetical imperatives are no imperatives at all. They are propositions concerning causal relations. If an imperative expresses an ought it cannot be heteronomous, and if it is heteronomous it cannot express an ought. Consequently, only two attitudes are possible toward positive law. Either the individual approves of it and experiences it as a concrete ought or he disapproves of it and fails to feel its obligatoriness. In the first case the particular law is law (right) in a genuine sense; in the second it is not law but force. Concerning the second point it must be urged in opposition to Kant that the ought of law is always found imbedded in a concrete situation. The individual finds himself face to face with two factors: on the one hand, commands; on the other, group obedience. For he obeys the person issuing the command not in so far as the latter is a private person, but in so far as he represents the judgments of value of the group and of himself. Law in this autonomous sense can never possess universal, but only relatively general, validity. The special concern of a theory of law is the source of law, i.e., the sense of right of the folk. Its chief question is: How far do the heteronomous commands of state, church, and international law agree with the autonomous law of the people? The age-old opposition between the people's law and the jurist's law must gradually be overcome. All heteronomous law must more and more be brought into agreement with the right or the ideal law which is found in the sense of right of humanity. BONNO TAPPER
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