Journal of Policy Modeling最新文献

Foreign currency borrowings by emerging market corporations have increased significantly post-global financial crisis. Extant literature has mainly focussed on the flow of foreign currency borrowings, and policies which control the volatility of the flow of the foreign currency borrowings. In this paper, we emphasize the stock of the foreign currency borrowings in the balance sheet of a firm instead of the flow of the foreign currency borrowings, and show the ineffectiveness of policies focused on controlling the flow of foreign currency borrowings. We use the data of non-financial Indian firms listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange. Our analysis show the fallacy of a policy focussed on controlling the flow of foreign currency borrowings. Despite policies which control the flow of the foreign currency borrowings, if a firm has a high stock of foreign currency borrowings in their balance sheet then the financial risk associated with the firm increases. A possible implication of our results is that too much foreign currency borrowings may pile up the risk in the financial system which may become a cause of concern.

Semi-subsistence households in developing countries play a considerable role as both producers and consumers of agricultural products, with a substantial part of their consumption contributed by home production for home consumption (HPHC). This study employs a modeling framework that integrates an HPHC augmented database with a modified economywide model that accommodates the distinct features of these households. Results from model simulations with border price shocks and several policy responses indicate that farm households are less influenced by external price shocks but are more responsive to enhancements in the local marketing system. Subsidies to strategic non-food imports during soaring prices appear less effective in inducing agents to engage in production. This finding suggests that the welfare gains reported by studies on price incentives locally, and agricultural policy reforms in developed market economies are likely to be large overestimates of the welfare implications for semi-subsistence households in many of the least developed economies.

We design a self-selection-pricing mechanism in which an electricity supplier offers its customers an optimal menu of contracts subject to a price ceiling set by the government, a hybrid model of market mechanism and government controls. We calibrate the model using information from a residential electricity market in China. Our mechanism outperforms the tiered-electricity-pricing system in China in terms of environmental and industrial sustainability but comes at the cost of providing less protection for low-income households (i.e., less equity). We conclude by offering measures of sustainability and equity that governments could use when trying to balance the trade-off between the two.

Public infrastructure procurement is a crucial policy tool, a prerequisite for public and private investments and for economic and social capital growth. Low performance in execution severely hinders infrastructure provision and benefits delivery. One of the most sensitive phases in public infrastructure procurement is the design because of the strategic relationship that it potentially creates between procurers and contractors in the execution stage, affecting the costs and the duration of the contract. In this paper, using recent developments in non-parametric frontiers and propensity score matching, we evaluate the performance in the execution of public works in Italy. The analysis provides robust evidence of significant improvement of performance where procurers opt for design and build contracts, which lead to lower transaction costs, allowing contractors to better accommodate the project in the execution. Our findings bear considerable policy implications.

This paper analyses the auction policy over enrollees’ monopoly rights introduced in the Chilean pension system. This policy was designed to promote competition in the pension fund market driven by private firms, after 30 years of operation. Since the Chilean pension fund system has inspired dozens of countries in the last forty years, the analysis of the design and performance of its relatively new auction mechanism is of worldwide interest. We present a theoretical and empirical model. Our theoretical model illustrates firms’ incentives to participate in the auction process. Our empirical analysis focuses on the effect of auctions on outcomes, such as fees, mark-ups, demand price elasticity, returns, and risk premiums. Despite the evidence shown for the positive benefits of the auction implementation, the current mechanism design is not considering that the biggest issue is the low individuals’ price response levels. Importantly, the current auction design only incentivizes new entrants to participate. Thus, the design generates low competition in the auction processes. Proper design should incentivize all firms to participate. Besides, we find that consumers’ price elasticity increased after the implementation of auctions, although demand is still generally inelastic. Interestingly, non-winning auction firms did not react in fees but may have reacted in other characteristics, such as returns and risk premiums.

Due to its focus on prediction rather than causal inference, machine learning has long been treated somewhat neglectfully in the economic literature. For several reasons, however, interest in machine learning has surged recently and is slowly finding its way into the econometric toolbox. Within the economic literature, regional integration has been one of the research areas at the forefront of this development, with various studies experimenting with different machine learning techniques to shed light on the complex dynamics governing regional integration processes. This paper provides the first systematic review of the literature that uses machine learning to study regional economic integration. The focus is twofold, first analysing studies along various thematic and methodological features (and the links between them), and then discussing the scope and nature of policy insights derived from the surveyed body of literature.

This study assesses the likely effects of different political structures on economic growth by the effects of interest rate on the linkage between financial markets. For this aim, we chose two developing economies with different governance structures, Iran and Argentina. There is a political structure in Iran influenced by religion, whereas Argentina’s political structure does not deal with religion. We first assess the causality amongst the financial markets of the stock market, bank deposits, and the foreign currency market (CM). Then, the effects of the markets and inflation on economic growth are assessed using Granger-causality tests and Markov-switching models. The results show that there are bidirectional causalities between the financial markets in Iran, and unidirectional causalities in Argentina. The markets affect economic growth in the both countries. For Iran, the monetary policy instrument of interest rate indicates no causalities to the markets, whereas there are strong causalities from interest rate to the markets in Argentina. As a result, Argentinian Central Bank can affect economic growth through the money flow between the markets by freely changing interest rate proportioned with the economic situation. Whereas there is no such a possibility for Iran’s Central Bank. In other words, an active Central bank against the inflation volatility in Argentina versus a passive Central Bank in Iran is one of the consequences of the interest rate repression in a political structure influenced by religion.

The main purpose of this paper is to check whether bank profitability benefits from bank diversification by considering the moderating role of the economic freedom (EF) and financial freedom (FF). This paper uses a sample of 83 conventional banks operating in the MENA countries over the period 2005–2020 and, performs an empirical approach based on the System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM). To get a better understanding and reliable results on the impact of NII on bank profitability, we split the MENA region in two sub-regions. The first block contains the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries with a sample of 40 banks and, the second covers the non-GCC countries with a sample of 43 banks. Empirical findings of the aggregate analysis reveal that bank profitability is more sensitive to bank diversification and, benefits from more EF and FF. Furthermore, we found that the interaction between bank diversification, EF and FF negatively affects the level of profitability. The results of the disaggregated analysis confirm the same findings concerning the positive effect of EF and FF and the negative effect of the interactional relationship. However, the effect of bank diversification differs across the two sub-samples.

Public subsidy, a frequently applied tool of economic development is often provided to the business sector assuming that it promotes investments, employment, and income generation. In this paper a micro economic model based empirical analysis is presented that shows the possible impact of public subsidy on economic growth. The outcomes are derived by investigating the investment decision of the enterprise with and without public subsidy. It is demonstrated that public subsidy may increase social welfare, but under certain circumstances it also may decrease it, partly because authorities deciding about them fail to consider the information on the investment projects that determines the outcome. The empirical analysis of corporate subsidies proves that both cases occur. The number of firms that performed well and presumably had not enough own resources to fund the investment was less than 10% of all subsidized firms. The programs had an overall negative impact on economic growth. We provide recommendations on how methods of evaluations, project selection and monitoring should be modified to achieve better results of subsidy programs.

Usually developing and transitional countries are characterised by foreign exchange and capital scarcities and hence resort to stringent trade and capital control policies. This might become counterproductive and provide incentives to the international traders and investors to go for corrupt practices. This paper investigates how do these tight policies might encourage illegal or hidden capital movements across borders. By presenting both a theoretical and an empirical analysis, where traders and investors rationally misreport to evade stringent trade and investment barriers, we first show that illegal capital outflow takes place through trade misreporting and interestingly, export and import misreporting are cointegrated. Secondly and more importantly illegal capital inflow might take place through overreporting of FDI values and illegal capital outflow and inflow are cointegrated too. Based on the thorough investigation of the BRICS – USA bilateral trade and FDI data, we propose that a less regulated trade and investment regime might benefit these countries more as tight and restrictive policies seem to be self-defeating. Our study comes up with policy conclusions that might minimise the cross-border illegal capital movements.