Pub Date : 2021-03-01DOI: 10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.2.259
Chadly Stern, Jordan R. Axt
We investigated whether political ideology was associated with the endorsement of race and gender stereotypes, and examined motivational and cognitive factors that could account for any ideological differences. Across five preregistered studies, people who were more politically conservative more strongly supported the use of stereotypes to make social inferences based on race, and endorsed specific stereotypes about racial and gender groups. An internal meta-analysis indicated that a greater desire to uphold group-based hierarchy and lower epistemic motivation to deliberate explained, in part, why conservatives were more likely to endorse the use of stereotypes, while cognitive ability did not have a significant explanatory role. These findings suggest that characteristics of individuals not inherently linked to any particular social group can shape perceptions about whether stereotypes are valid, and highlight how basic psychological motivations lead liberals and conservatives to diverge in their perceptions of groups.
{"title":"Ideological Differences in Race and Gender Stereotyping","authors":"Chadly Stern, Jordan R. Axt","doi":"10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.2.259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.2.259","url":null,"abstract":"We investigated whether political ideology was associated with the endorsement of race and gender stereotypes, and examined motivational and cognitive factors that could account for any ideological differences. Across five preregistered studies, people who were more politically conservative more strongly supported the use of stereotypes to make social inferences based on race, and endorsed specific stereotypes about racial and gender groups. An internal meta-analysis indicated that a greater desire to uphold group-based hierarchy and lower epistemic motivation to deliberate explained, in part, why conservatives were more likely to endorse the use of stereotypes, while cognitive ability did not have a significant explanatory role. These findings suggest that characteristics of individuals not inherently linked to any particular social group can shape perceptions about whether stereotypes are valid, and highlight how basic psychological motivations lead liberals and conservatives to diverge in their perceptions of groups.","PeriodicalId":48050,"journal":{"name":"Social Cognition","volume":"39 1","pages":"259-294"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45760191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-01DOI: 10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.2.225
Nadine Knab, Kevin Winter, M. Steffens
Since the increase in numbers of refugees worldwide, the acceptance of refugees in host countries is a highly contested topic. Negative attitudes towards refugees pose a challenge to both integration efforts and social cohesion. So-called paradoxical interventions help mitigating such extreme attitudes, but little is known about the cognitive processes elicited by these interventions. This research investigated whether a paradoxical leading-questions intervention targeting anti-refugee attitudes increases cognitive flexibility, especially among those with anti-refugee attitudes. Results of two preregistered experiments with general-population samples (N= 306) provide evidence that participants with anti-refugee attitudes showed higher cognitive flexibility in the paradoxical condition compared to control conditions. Thereby, this research proposes a cognitive foundation for the benefits of paradoxical interventions in intergroup contexts and suggests novel indications as to why these interventions are effective. We discuss the potential of paradoxical interventions for other important socially contested contexts, such as vaccination and climate change.
{"title":"Flexing the Extremes: Increasing Cognitive Flexibility With a Paradoxical Leading Questions Intervention","authors":"Nadine Knab, Kevin Winter, M. Steffens","doi":"10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.2.225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.2.225","url":null,"abstract":"Since the increase in numbers of refugees worldwide, the acceptance of refugees in host countries is a highly contested topic. Negative attitudes towards refugees pose a challenge to both integration efforts and social cohesion. So-called paradoxical interventions help mitigating such extreme attitudes, but little is known about the cognitive processes elicited by these interventions. This research investigated whether a paradoxical leading-questions intervention targeting anti-refugee attitudes increases cognitive flexibility, especially among those with anti-refugee attitudes. Results of two preregistered experiments with general-population samples (N= 306) provide evidence that participants with anti-refugee attitudes showed higher cognitive flexibility in the paradoxical condition compared to control conditions. Thereby, this research proposes a cognitive foundation for the benefits of paradoxical interventions in intergroup contexts and suggests novel indications as to why these interventions are effective. We discuss the potential of paradoxical interventions for other important socially contested contexts, such as vaccination and climate change.","PeriodicalId":48050,"journal":{"name":"Social Cognition","volume":"39 1","pages":"225-242"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46866838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
H. Bai, Hyun Euh, Christopher M. Federico, E. Borgida
Past research on moral dilemmas has thoroughly investigated the roles of personality and situational variables, but the role of targets in moral dilemmas has been relatively neglected. This paper presents findings from four experiments that manipulate the perceived dehumanization of targets in moral dilemmas. Studies 1, 2 and 4 suggest that dehumanized targets may render the decision easier, and with less emotion. Findings from Studies 1 and 3, though not Studies 2 and 4, show that dehumanization of targets in dilemmas may lead participants to make less deontological judgments. Study 3, but not Study 4, suggests that it is potentially because dehumanization has an effect on reducing deontological, but not utilitarian judgments. Though the patterns are somewhat inconsistent across studies, overall, results suggest that targets’ dehumanization can play a role in how people make their decisions in moral dilemmas.
{"title":"Thou Shalt Not Kill, Unless It Is Not a Human: Target Dehumanization May Influence Decision Difficulty and Response Patterns for Moral Dilemmas","authors":"H. Bai, Hyun Euh, Christopher M. Federico, E. Borgida","doi":"10.31234/OSF.IO/FKNRD","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/OSF.IO/FKNRD","url":null,"abstract":"Past research on moral dilemmas has thoroughly investigated the roles of personality and situational variables, but the role of targets in moral dilemmas has been relatively neglected. This paper presents findings from four experiments that manipulate the perceived dehumanization of targets in moral dilemmas. Studies 1, 2 and 4 suggest that dehumanized targets may render the decision easier, and with less emotion. Findings from Studies 1 and 3, though not Studies 2 and 4, show that dehumanization of targets in dilemmas may lead participants to make less deontological judgments. Study 3, but not Study 4, suggests that it is potentially because dehumanization has an effect on reducing deontological, but not utilitarian judgments. Though the patterns are somewhat inconsistent across studies, overall, results suggest that targets’ dehumanization can play a role in how people make their decisions in moral dilemmas.","PeriodicalId":48050,"journal":{"name":"Social Cognition","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48701278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.81
J. Wright
Living together cooperatively in groups requires creating and maintaining healthy socio-cultural normative structures (i.e., shared “normed” beliefs, values, practices, and so on) that allow all members of the group to function well, both as individuals and as a part of the communal whole. This requires maintaining a delicate and dynamic balance between protecting members of the group from undue harm, while allowing for individual freedom, choice, and creativity—for example, determining when a new belief, value, or practice is a form of acceptable (even desirable) diversity to be allowed, and when it is a form of deviance to be shut down. I will argue that maintaining this balance is the primary function of morality—and that it requires an understanding of ourselves as moral beings oriented towards “the good” that is stable enough to be shared and passed down to future generations, yet flexible enough to adapt and change as our cumulative experiences expand and alter that understanding.
{"title":"Morality as a Regulator of Divergence: Protecting Against Deviance While Promoting Diversity","authors":"J. Wright","doi":"10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.81","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.81","url":null,"abstract":"Living together cooperatively in groups requires creating and maintaining healthy socio-cultural normative structures (i.e., shared “normed” beliefs, values, practices, and so on) that allow all members of the group to function well, both as individuals and as a part of the communal whole. This requires maintaining a delicate and dynamic balance between protecting members of the group from undue harm, while allowing for individual freedom, choice, and creativity—for example, determining when a new belief, value, or practice is a form of acceptable (even desirable) diversity to be allowed, and when it is a form of deviance to be shut down. I will argue that maintaining this balance is the primary function of morality—and that it requires an understanding of ourselves as moral beings oriented towards “the good” that is stable enough to be shared and passed down to future generations, yet flexible enough to adapt and change as our cumulative experiences expand and alter that understanding.","PeriodicalId":48050,"journal":{"name":"Social Cognition","volume":"39 1","pages":"81-98"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43179093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.19
Lily Tsoi, J. Hamlin, A. Waytz, A. Baron, L. Young
Three studies test whether people engage in mental state reasoning or theory of mind (ToM) differently across two fundamental social contexts: cooperation and competition. Study 1 examines how children with an emerging understanding of false beliefs deploy ToM across these contexts. We find that young preschool children are better able to plant false beliefs in others’ minds in a cooperative versus competitive context; this difference does not emerge for other cognitive capacities tested (e.g., executive functioning, memory). Studies 2a and 2b reveal the same systematic difference in adults’ ToM for cooperation and competition, even after accounting for relevant predictors (e.g., preference for a task condition, feelings about deception). Together, these findings provide initial evidence for enhanced ToM for cooperation versus competition in early development and also adulthood.
{"title":"A Cooperation Advantage for Theory of Mind in Children and Adults","authors":"Lily Tsoi, J. Hamlin, A. Waytz, A. Baron, L. Young","doi":"10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.19","url":null,"abstract":"Three studies test whether people engage in mental state reasoning or theory of mind (ToM) differently across two fundamental social contexts: cooperation and competition. Study 1 examines how children with an emerging understanding of false beliefs deploy ToM across these contexts. We find that young preschool children are better able to plant false beliefs in others’ minds in a cooperative versus competitive context; this difference does not emerge for other cognitive capacities tested (e.g., executive functioning, memory). Studies 2a and 2b reveal the same systematic difference in adults’ ToM for cooperation and competition, even after accounting for relevant predictors (e.g., preference for a task condition, feelings about deception). Together, these findings provide initial evidence for enhanced ToM for cooperation versus competition in early development and also adulthood.","PeriodicalId":48050,"journal":{"name":"Social Cognition","volume":"39 1","pages":"19-40"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42960469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.59
James F. M. Cornwell, Olivia Mandelbaum, Allison T. Bajger, Raymond D. Crookes, D. Krantz, E. Higgins
Moral psychology is used to explore the interaction between regulatory mode (locomotion; assessment) and diurnal preference (“early birds”; “night owls”). Moral and immoral behavior was partly explained by an interaction between regulatory mode and the time of day the task took place. In Studies 1a and 1b, we established a relation between self-reported diurnal preference and regulatory mode using both a chronic measure and an induction: stronger locomotion preferring an earlier time of day; stronger assessment preferring a later time of day. In Study 2, we show that those with a locomotion predominance were less likely to invest in a public good later in the day compared to those with an assessment predominance. Lastly, in Study 3, those induced into an assessment mode were more likely to cheat when randomly assigned to complete a task in the morning compared to those induced into a locomotion mode.
{"title":"Locomoting Larks and Assessing Owls: Morality from Mode and Time of Day","authors":"James F. M. Cornwell, Olivia Mandelbaum, Allison T. Bajger, Raymond D. Crookes, D. Krantz, E. Higgins","doi":"10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.59","url":null,"abstract":"Moral psychology is used to explore the interaction between regulatory mode (locomotion; assessment) and diurnal preference (“early birds”; “night owls”). Moral and immoral behavior was partly explained by an interaction between regulatory mode and the time of day the task took place. In Studies 1a and 1b, we established a relation between self-reported diurnal preference and regulatory mode using both a chronic measure and an induction: stronger locomotion preferring an earlier time of day; stronger assessment preferring a later time of day. In Study 2, we show that those with a locomotion predominance were less likely to invest in a public good later in the day compared to those with an assessment predominance. Lastly, in Study 3, those induced into an assessment mode were more likely to cheat when randomly assigned to complete a task in the morning compared to those induced into a locomotion mode.","PeriodicalId":48050,"journal":{"name":"Social Cognition","volume":"39 1","pages":"59-80"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48496338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.41
D. Luke, Bertram Gawronski
Research on moral dilemma judgment suggests that higher levels of psychopathy are associated with a greater preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments. The current research investigated whether this association reflects (1) differences in the understanding of what society considers right or wrong or (2) differences in personal standards about the acceptability of certain actions. Using the CNI model, we further explored whether the obtained differences are rooted in differential standards regarding the significance of consequences, moral norms, or general action preferences. The results suggest that (1) both differences in personal standards and differences in perceived societal standards contribute to associations between psychopathy and moral dilemma judgments and (2) personal and perceived societal standards play different roles for different determinants of moral dilemma judgments. Implications for clinical and moral psychology and for research at their intersection are discussed.
{"title":"Psychopathy and Moral Dilemma Judgments: A CNI Model Analysis of Personal and Perceived Societal Standards","authors":"D. Luke, Bertram Gawronski","doi":"10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.41","url":null,"abstract":"Research on moral dilemma judgment suggests that higher levels of psychopathy are associated with a greater preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments. The current research investigated whether this association reflects (1) differences in the understanding of what society considers right or wrong or (2) differences in personal standards about the acceptability of certain actions. Using the CNI model, we further explored whether the obtained differences are rooted in differential standards regarding the significance of consequences, moral norms, or general action preferences. The results suggest that (1) both differences in personal standards and differences in perceived societal standards contribute to associations between psychopathy and moral dilemma judgments and (2) personal and perceived societal standards play different roles for different determinants of moral dilemma judgments. Implications for clinical and moral psychology and for research at their intersection are discussed.","PeriodicalId":48050,"journal":{"name":"Social Cognition","volume":"39 1","pages":"41-58"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48050247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.99
Leon Li, M. Tomasello
Previous comparisons of language and morality have taken a cognitively internalist (i.e., within-minds) perspective. We take a socially externalist (i.e., between-minds) perspective, viewing both language and morality as forms of social action. During human evolution, social cognitive adaptations for cooperation evolved, including cooperative communication (social acts to mentally coordinate with others for common goals) and social normativity (social acts to regulate cooperative social relationships). As human cooperation scaled up in complexity, cooperative communication and social normativity scaled up as well, leading to the development of culturally elaborated forms of language and morality. Language facilitates all aspects of morality and is even necessary for certain aspects. Humans use language to (1) initiate, (2) preserve, (3) revise, and (4) act on morality in ways such as forming joint commitments, teaching norms, modifying social realities, and engaging in moral reason-giving.
{"title":"On the Moral Functions of Language","authors":"Leon Li, M. Tomasello","doi":"10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.99","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.99","url":null,"abstract":"Previous comparisons of language and morality have taken a cognitively internalist (i.e., within-minds) perspective. We take a socially externalist (i.e., between-minds) perspective, viewing both language and morality as forms of social action. During human evolution, social cognitive adaptations for cooperation evolved, including cooperative communication (social acts to mentally coordinate with others for common goals) and social normativity (social acts to regulate cooperative social relationships). As human cooperation scaled up in complexity, cooperative communication and social normativity scaled up as well, leading to the development of culturally elaborated forms of language and morality. Language facilitates all aspects of morality and is even necessary for certain aspects. Humans use language to (1) initiate, (2) preserve, (3) revise, and (4) act on morality in ways such as forming joint commitments, teaching norms, modifying social realities, and engaging in moral reason-giving.","PeriodicalId":48050,"journal":{"name":"Social Cognition","volume":"39 1","pages":"99-116"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47360287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
People struggle to stay motivated to work toward difficult goals. Sometimes the feeling of difficulty signals that the goal is important and worth pursuing; other times, it signals that the goal is impossible and should be abandoned. In this paper, we argue that how difficulty is experienced depends on how we perceive and experience the timing of difficult events. We synthesize research from across the social and behavioral sciences and propose a new integrated model to explain how components of time perception interact with interpretations of experienced difficulty to influence motivation and goal-directed behavior. Although these constructs have been studied separately in previous research, we suggest that these factors are inseparable and that an integrated model will help us to better understand motivation and predict behavior. We conclude with new empirical questions to guide future research and by discussing the implications of this research for both theory and intervention practice.
{"title":"When the Going Gets Tough, How Do We Perceive the Future?","authors":"Tepper Sj, Neil A. Lewis","doi":"10.31234/OSF.IO/PKAXN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/OSF.IO/PKAXN","url":null,"abstract":"People struggle to stay motivated to work toward difficult goals. Sometimes the feeling of difficulty signals that the goal is important and worth pursuing; other times, it signals that the goal is impossible and should be abandoned. In this paper, we argue that how difficulty is experienced depends on how we perceive and experience the timing of difficult events. We synthesize research from across the social and behavioral sciences and propose a new integrated model to explain how components of time perception interact with interpretations of experienced difficulty to influence motivation and goal-directed behavior. Although these constructs have been studied separately in previous research, we suggest that these factors are inseparable and that an integrated model will help us to better understand motivation and predict behavior. We conclude with new empirical questions to guide future research and by discussing the implications of this research for both theory and intervention practice.","PeriodicalId":48050,"journal":{"name":"Social Cognition","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42890493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.166
K. Cousar, N. Carnes, Sasha Y. Kimel
Past research finds contradictory evidence suggesting that religion both reduces and increases violent conflict. We argue that morality is an important hub mechanism that can help us understand this disputed relationship. Moreover, to reconcile this, as well as the factors underlying religion’s impact on increased violence (i.e., belief versus practice), we draw on Virtuous Violence Theory and newly synthesize it with research on both moral cognition and social identity. We suggest that the combined effect of moral cognition and social identity may substantially increase violence beyond what either facilitates alone. We test our claims using multilevel analysis of data from the World Values Survey and find a nuanced effect of religion on people’s beliefs about violence. Specifically, religious individuals were less likely to condone violence while religious countries were more likely to. This combination of theoretical and empirical work helps disentangle the interwoven nature of morality, religion, and violence.
{"title":"Morality as Fuel for Violence? Disentangling the Role of Religion in Violent Conflict","authors":"K. Cousar, N. Carnes, Sasha Y. Kimel","doi":"10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1521/SOCO.2021.39.1.166","url":null,"abstract":"Past research finds contradictory evidence suggesting that religion both reduces and increases violent conflict. We argue that morality is an important hub mechanism that can help us understand this disputed relationship. Moreover, to reconcile this, as well as the factors underlying religion’s impact on increased violence (i.e., belief versus practice), we draw on Virtuous Violence Theory and newly synthesize it with research on both moral cognition and social identity. We suggest that the combined effect of moral cognition and social identity may substantially increase violence beyond what either facilitates alone. We test our claims using multilevel analysis of data from the World Values Survey and find a nuanced effect of religion on people’s beliefs about violence. Specifically, religious individuals were less likely to condone violence while religious countries were more likely to. This combination of theoretical and empirical work helps disentangle the interwoven nature of morality, religion, and violence.","PeriodicalId":48050,"journal":{"name":"Social Cognition","volume":"39 1","pages":"166-182"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46478564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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