H ere is one way that, in ordinary speech, we mark the distinction between science and art. We say that scientists discover things—the relationship between the volume and pressure of air was discovered by Boyle; nuclear fission was discovered by Hahn, Strassmann, and Meitner; the structure of DNA was discovered by Watson and Crick. We say, however, that artists invent, compose, construct, or make things—Mozart composed Così fan tutte; Botticelli made La Primavera; Philip Roth invented Nathan Zuckerman. In ordinary speech, all genuine art is made up and no genuine science is made up. Again, in ordinary speech, the difference between these categories is fundamental: it’s an important way we have to distinguish science and art in the stream of culture, to assign them to different institutions, to give us confidence in our distinctions, to hold them to different standards, and to assign them to different schemes of value. The categories also mark out different kinds of relationship between the named responsible people, and what it is they are said to be responsible for. And it picks out different existential standings for the
{"title":"Making Art / Discovering Science","authors":"S. Shapin","doi":"10.1086/699899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/699899","url":null,"abstract":"H ere is one way that, in ordinary speech, we mark the distinction between science and art. We say that scientists discover things—the relationship between the volume and pressure of air was discovered by Boyle; nuclear fission was discovered by Hahn, Strassmann, and Meitner; the structure of DNA was discovered by Watson and Crick. We say, however, that artists invent, compose, construct, or make things—Mozart composed Così fan tutte; Botticelli made La Primavera; Philip Roth invented Nathan Zuckerman. In ordinary speech, all genuine art is made up and no genuine science is made up. Again, in ordinary speech, the difference between these categories is fundamental: it’s an important way we have to distinguish science and art in the stream of culture, to assign them to different institutions, to give us confidence in our distinctions, to hold them to different standards, and to assign them to different schemes of value. The categories also mark out different kinds of relationship between the named responsible people, and what it is they are said to be responsible for. And it picks out different existential standings for the","PeriodicalId":187662,"journal":{"name":"KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123026138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ocial sciences like anthropology and sociology have lived several different but overlapping lives in Iran. As Europeanimported discourses about society and history, they informed competing modernist political trends from the nineteenth century onward. As academic fields instituted after the 1950s, they aided the Pahlavi regime’s top-down modernization program and continue to act as applied, problem-solving disciplines to this day. As forms of revolutionary praxis in the 1970s, they galvanized militant students to overthrow the monarchic regime and build a new society from the bottom. In the decades since the 1979 Revolution, they have branched off in still more directions: in epistemological debates on science and civilization, and in critiques of the sacralization of power and bureaucratization of religion in the Islamic Republic. These diverse “lives” of the social sciences are intertwined in complex ways with Islam, where the latter must also be understood in a multiplicity of forms: on the one hand, Islam as a tradition comprising many disciplines of inquiry ( jurisprudence, theology, mysticism, ethics, Qurʾanic exegesis, hadith scholarship, and so on), and on the other
{"title":"Varieties of Islamic Social Science","authors":"Alireza Doostdar","doi":"10.1086/699019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/699019","url":null,"abstract":"ocial sciences like anthropology and sociology have lived several different but overlapping lives in Iran. As Europeanimported discourses about society and history, they informed competing modernist political trends from the nineteenth century onward. As academic fields instituted after the 1950s, they aided the Pahlavi regime’s top-down modernization program and continue to act as applied, problem-solving disciplines to this day. As forms of revolutionary praxis in the 1970s, they galvanized militant students to overthrow the monarchic regime and build a new society from the bottom. In the decades since the 1979 Revolution, they have branched off in still more directions: in epistemological debates on science and civilization, and in critiques of the sacralization of power and bureaucratization of religion in the Islamic Republic. These diverse “lives” of the social sciences are intertwined in complex ways with Islam, where the latter must also be understood in a multiplicity of forms: on the one hand, Islam as a tradition comprising many disciplines of inquiry ( jurisprudence, theology, mysticism, ethics, Qurʾanic exegesis, hadith scholarship, and so on), and on the other","PeriodicalId":187662,"journal":{"name":"KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127779693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F uturists thrive on narratives of convulsive change. Their futures unfurl under banner headlines like “the end of an era,” “this changes everything,” and “nothingwill be the same.” Their moments of disruption pit the unprecedented against forces of resistance associated with habit and tradition. For them human history is a skyscraper with a potentially unlimited number of stories. But it’s an edifice haunted by a ghost: the inevitability that fast-paced anthropocentric dreams of perpetual innovation will eventually fall prey to history’s millennial plate-tectonic movements. Within the setting of these convulsive narratives, libraries began to appear on extinction time lines in the early 2000s in the company of newspapers and printed books. Prudent futurists predicted that the last physical library would shut its doors in the late twenty-first century. Bullish brethren, like the scenario thinkers Richard Watson and Ross Dawson, pointed instead to 2019 as themoment of libraries’ passage to “insignificance,” citing the recent surge in sales of e-books and the first experiments with bookless libraries.
{"title":"The Permanent Library of the Now","authors":"J. Schnapp","doi":"10.1086/699555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/699555","url":null,"abstract":"F uturists thrive on narratives of convulsive change. Their futures unfurl under banner headlines like “the end of an era,” “this changes everything,” and “nothingwill be the same.” Their moments of disruption pit the unprecedented against forces of resistance associated with habit and tradition. For them human history is a skyscraper with a potentially unlimited number of stories. But it’s an edifice haunted by a ghost: the inevitability that fast-paced anthropocentric dreams of perpetual innovation will eventually fall prey to history’s millennial plate-tectonic movements. Within the setting of these convulsive narratives, libraries began to appear on extinction time lines in the early 2000s in the company of newspapers and printed books. Prudent futurists predicted that the last physical library would shut its doors in the late twenty-first century. Bullish brethren, like the scenario thinkers Richard Watson and Ross Dawson, pointed instead to 2019 as themoment of libraries’ passage to “insignificance,” citing the recent surge in sales of e-books and the first experiments with bookless libraries.","PeriodicalId":187662,"journal":{"name":"KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122957464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F or those of us who work in the historical and contemporary interstices of knowledge and power, howwe identify what counts as the former and shapes the attributes of the latter— and vice versa—is a domain of exploding interest, of new research, of new and renewed debates. So much so that one might think that the murky nexus of knowing and inciting, of naming and shaming, of classifying and enraging has not been as profoundly on the agenda in the study of knowledge before. I’m thinking here of how sentiment/ emotion/feeling figure on our conceptual and political radars—what they tell us about social inequalities, the epistemics on which sentiments are imagined to depend, and what work we imagine they do to make and mark the distinctions among what Ian Hacking would once call “human kinds.” If the ubiquity of this “affective turn” in the human sciences is new, attentiveness in history, philosophy, and political theory to the operative working of emotion is not. Long before engagement with the social coordinates of sentiment, or “affect theory” specifically, took hold in European and US universities, a range of diverse advocates
{"title":"The Politics of “Gut Feelings”: On Sentiment in Governance and the Law","authors":"A. Stoler","doi":"10.1086/699009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/699009","url":null,"abstract":"F or those of us who work in the historical and contemporary interstices of knowledge and power, howwe identify what counts as the former and shapes the attributes of the latter— and vice versa—is a domain of exploding interest, of new research, of new and renewed debates. So much so that one might think that the murky nexus of knowing and inciting, of naming and shaming, of classifying and enraging has not been as profoundly on the agenda in the study of knowledge before. I’m thinking here of how sentiment/ emotion/feeling figure on our conceptual and political radars—what they tell us about social inequalities, the epistemics on which sentiments are imagined to depend, and what work we imagine they do to make and mark the distinctions among what Ian Hacking would once call “human kinds.” If the ubiquity of this “affective turn” in the human sciences is new, attentiveness in history, philosophy, and political theory to the operative working of emotion is not. Long before engagement with the social coordinates of sentiment, or “affect theory” specifically, took hold in European and US universities, a range of diverse advocates","PeriodicalId":187662,"journal":{"name":"KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124970465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The evaluation of scholarly works used to be interpretively complex but technologically simple. One read and evaluated an author’s publication, manuscript, or grant proposal together with the evidence it contained or referred to. Scholars have been doing this for centuries, by themselves, from their desks, best if in the proximity of a good library. Peer review — the epitome of academic judgment and its independence — slowly grew from this model of scholarly evaluation by scholars. Things have dramatically changed in recent years. The assessment of scholars and their work may now start and end with a simple Google Scholar search or other quantitative, auditing-like techniques that make reading publications superfluous. This is a world of evaluation not populated by scholars practicing peer review, but by a variety of methods and actors dispersed across academic institutions, data analytics companies, and media outlets tracking anything from citation counts (of books, journals, and conference abstracts) and journal impact factors, to a variety of indicators like H-index, Eigenfactor, CiteScore, SCImago Journal Rank, as well as altmetrics. We have moved from descriptive metrics used by scientists and scholars, to evaluative metrics used by outsiders who typically do not have technical knowledge of the field they seek to evaluate. This is a shift that reflects a fundamental and increasingly naturalized assumption that the number or frequency of citations received by a publication is, somehow, an index of its quality or value.
{"title":"Quality to Impact, Text to Metadata: Publication and Evaluation in the Age of Metrics","authors":"M. Biagioli","doi":"10.1086/699152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/699152","url":null,"abstract":"The evaluation of scholarly works used to be interpretively complex but technologically simple. One read and evaluated an author’s publication, manuscript, or grant proposal together with the evidence it contained or referred to. Scholars have been doing this for centuries, by themselves, from their desks, best if in the proximity of a good library. Peer review — the epitome of academic judgment and its independence — slowly grew from this model of scholarly evaluation by scholars. \u0000 \u0000Things have dramatically changed in recent years. The assessment of scholars and their work may now start and end with a simple Google Scholar search or other quantitative, auditing-like techniques that make reading publications superfluous. This is a world of evaluation not populated by scholars practicing peer review, but by a variety of methods and actors dispersed across academic institutions, data analytics companies, and media outlets tracking anything from citation counts (of books, journals, and conference abstracts) and journal impact factors, to a variety of indicators like H-index, Eigenfactor, CiteScore, SCImago Journal Rank, as well as altmetrics. We have moved from descriptive metrics used by scientists and scholars, to evaluative metrics used by outsiders who typically do not have technical knowledge of the field they seek to evaluate. This is a shift that reflects a fundamental and increasingly naturalized assumption that the number or frequency of citations received by a publication is, somehow, an index of its quality or value.","PeriodicalId":187662,"journal":{"name":"KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129087742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A s he prepared for the Constitutional Convention in the spring of 1787, JamesMadison plunged into a thorough study of historical confederacies, from the ancient Greeks to the then-modern Dutch and German federations. His inquiry, which was informed by materials he had requested from Thomas Jefferson in France, was both schematic and thorough: he picked six cases to focus on, and for each confederacy recorded the various rules of representation, theallocationofpowersbetweencenterandsubgovernment, and various facts about the performance of the system. He assessed costs and benefits—or as he put it in the language of the time, “virtues and vices”—and drew lessons for the project of reorganizing the United States into a viable federal government. Madison’s chief conclusion was that weakness of the federal center was highly risky, shaping his proposals at the Philadelphia convention. Madison’s broader effort to informconstitutional designwith comparative data has proved to be enduring. We revere the American founding fathers asmasters of applied political theory,who leveraged
{"title":"Constitutional Knowledge","authors":"Tom Ginsburg","doi":"10.1086/696296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/696296","url":null,"abstract":"A s he prepared for the Constitutional Convention in the spring of 1787, JamesMadison plunged into a thorough study of historical confederacies, from the ancient Greeks to the then-modern Dutch and German federations. His inquiry, which was informed by materials he had requested from Thomas Jefferson in France, was both schematic and thorough: he picked six cases to focus on, and for each confederacy recorded the various rules of representation, theallocationofpowersbetweencenterandsubgovernment, and various facts about the performance of the system. He assessed costs and benefits—or as he put it in the language of the time, “virtues and vices”—and drew lessons for the project of reorganizing the United States into a viable federal government. Madison’s chief conclusion was that weakness of the federal center was highly risky, shaping his proposals at the Philadelphia convention. Madison’s broader effort to informconstitutional designwith comparative data has proved to be enduring. We revere the American founding fathers asmasters of applied political theory,who leveraged","PeriodicalId":187662,"journal":{"name":"KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121888599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C an we speak of distinct Eastern andWestern ways of knowing? Or of more or less undifferentiated East/West ways of knowing? Or of East/West ways of knowing of which we can speak, as opposed to North/South ways of knowing, of which we cannot really speak? All three propositions exist in the real world. As the essentialization of East andWest implied in thefirst proposition leads to a predictable faith-based outcome that is not really attractive, and as I have never worked on North-South transcultural interaction say, between Eurasia and Africa, allow me to deal with the second. There can be no question that since time immemorial, knowledge has traveled as something consciously adopted across Eurasia, whether this refers to domesticated plants and animals and the techniques of their handling, to leisure pursuits, to the idea of writing, to features of governance, or to ways to secure the functionality of the body, the mind, or the surrounding life-world. Below this conscious level of interaction, the hidden forces of nature do their own interaction, which one might call trans-natural, be it in the domain of genes, of diseases
{"title":"Can We Speak of East/West Ways of Knowing?","authors":"R. Wagner","doi":"10.1086/696340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/696340","url":null,"abstract":"C an we speak of distinct Eastern andWestern ways of knowing? Or of more or less undifferentiated East/West ways of knowing? Or of East/West ways of knowing of which we can speak, as opposed to North/South ways of knowing, of which we cannot really speak? All three propositions exist in the real world. As the essentialization of East andWest implied in thefirst proposition leads to a predictable faith-based outcome that is not really attractive, and as I have never worked on North-South transcultural interaction say, between Eurasia and Africa, allow me to deal with the second. There can be no question that since time immemorial, knowledge has traveled as something consciously adopted across Eurasia, whether this refers to domesticated plants and animals and the techniques of their handling, to leisure pursuits, to the idea of writing, to features of governance, or to ways to secure the functionality of the body, the mind, or the surrounding life-world. Below this conscious level of interaction, the hidden forces of nature do their own interaction, which one might call trans-natural, be it in the domain of genes, of diseases","PeriodicalId":187662,"journal":{"name":"KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129669675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By contemporary accounts, the traditional Jewish Bible is an anthology of Hebrew pieces of literature from ancient Israel, Judea, and Babylon. Its materials—compositions, collections, collated fragments, and more—span the ninth to second centuries BCE, from the period of Assyrian domination, through the Babylonian and Persian, and into the Hellenistic. Sociological and technological developments in the late sixth century BCE made large, durable parchment scrolls available to Judean text-professionals, andprompted their idea to use them to store the valued contents of the smaller, less durable papyrus ones that had long served and predominated, in particular papyri featuring the nation’s god and heroes. Over several centuries, text-professionals gathered the papyrus remains of earlier periods and contemporary works too, collating and editing them. The literary record from the fifth century BCE to the first century CE, in the Persian and Hellenistic periods, shows that this concentrated, controlled storage—ancient “big data”— went beyond aiding preservation to facilitate a vibrant culture of mastering thecontents,hermeneuticengagement, adaptation innewworks, public reading events, literal and political applications, text-centered
{"title":"Knowledge of the Lord in the Hebrew Bible","authors":"Simeon Chavel","doi":"10.1086/696983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/696983","url":null,"abstract":"By contemporary accounts, the traditional Jewish Bible is an anthology of Hebrew pieces of literature from ancient Israel, Judea, and Babylon. Its materials—compositions, collections, collated fragments, and more—span the ninth to second centuries BCE, from the period of Assyrian domination, through the Babylonian and Persian, and into the Hellenistic. Sociological and technological developments in the late sixth century BCE made large, durable parchment scrolls available to Judean text-professionals, andprompted their idea to use them to store the valued contents of the smaller, less durable papyrus ones that had long served and predominated, in particular papyri featuring the nation’s god and heroes. Over several centuries, text-professionals gathered the papyrus remains of earlier periods and contemporary works too, collating and editing them. The literary record from the fifth century BCE to the first century CE, in the Persian and Hellenistic periods, shows that this concentrated, controlled storage—ancient “big data”— went beyond aiding preservation to facilitate a vibrant culture of mastering thecontents,hermeneuticengagement, adaptation innewworks, public reading events, literal and political applications, text-centered","PeriodicalId":187662,"journal":{"name":"KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133972686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T he process of knowledge formation and transmittal can be studied historically, at the level of societies and their cultures, or at the level of the individual and over the course of an individual’s life. Take scientific knowledge, for example. The production of scientific knowledge by an individual is often associated with the concept of “creativity.” According to social scientists, scientific knowledge production can qualify as creative if such knowledge is novel, is useful (e.g., it leads to theoretical advances in a discipline, or new technological applications), and has high impact. The concept of creativity, however, does not apply only to scientific inquiry, but also to human activities in many other domains such as, for the example, the arts. Whether similar or different types of creativity are involved in science and in the arts is a question that has generated a great deal of research. Two important aspects of creativity have been identified by research in psychology and cognitive science. First, creativity is usually the product of a gradual and complex process, rather than of a sudden leap of imagination. Second, there is a relationship between previous
{"title":"Creativity Patterns in the Production of Scientific Theories and Literary Fiction","authors":"Coltan Scrivner, D. Maestripieri","doi":"10.1086/696984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/696984","url":null,"abstract":"T he process of knowledge formation and transmittal can be studied historically, at the level of societies and their cultures, or at the level of the individual and over the course of an individual’s life. Take scientific knowledge, for example. The production of scientific knowledge by an individual is often associated with the concept of “creativity.” According to social scientists, scientific knowledge production can qualify as creative if such knowledge is novel, is useful (e.g., it leads to theoretical advances in a discipline, or new technological applications), and has high impact. The concept of creativity, however, does not apply only to scientific inquiry, but also to human activities in many other domains such as, for the example, the arts. Whether similar or different types of creativity are involved in science and in the arts is a question that has generated a great deal of research. Two important aspects of creativity have been identified by research in psychology and cognitive science. First, creativity is usually the product of a gradual and complex process, rather than of a sudden leap of imagination. Second, there is a relationship between previous","PeriodicalId":187662,"journal":{"name":"KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129207901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M y subject is a crucial episode in the story of how historical explanation fell out of favor as an element of naturalist understanding: how history found itself banished from science. This is a subject close to my heart since I teach at Stanford, where the social and intellectual world, at least among the students, is divided into the Techies and the Fuzzies. Mine of course are the Fuzzies, but it’s a deeply unjust misnomer: they are as rigorous and empirical as any engineer. More to my point here, the Techies’ intellectualworld is greatly limited by its segregation from theirworld, my Fuzzies’, and specifically, from historical knowledge as a mode of naturalist scientific understanding. But I meant to begin not at Stanford, but with Napoleon. Bear with me. I want to begin with Napoleon’s disdain for historical and philosophical forms of explanation in science, and his preference for a scientific approach thatwas specifically neither philosophical nor historical.
{"title":"The Naturalist and the Emperor, a Tragedy in Three Acts; or, How History Fell Out of Favor as a Way of Knowing Nature","authors":"J. Riskin","doi":"10.1086/697169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/697169","url":null,"abstract":"M y subject is a crucial episode in the story of how historical explanation fell out of favor as an element of naturalist understanding: how history found itself banished from science. This is a subject close to my heart since I teach at Stanford, where the social and intellectual world, at least among the students, is divided into the Techies and the Fuzzies. Mine of course are the Fuzzies, but it’s a deeply unjust misnomer: they are as rigorous and empirical as any engineer. More to my point here, the Techies’ intellectualworld is greatly limited by its segregation from theirworld, my Fuzzies’, and specifically, from historical knowledge as a mode of naturalist scientific understanding. But I meant to begin not at Stanford, but with Napoleon. Bear with me. I want to begin with Napoleon’s disdain for historical and philosophical forms of explanation in science, and his preference for a scientific approach thatwas specifically neither philosophical nor historical.","PeriodicalId":187662,"journal":{"name":"KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128326074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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