Cognitive Systems Research最新文献

The Turing Machine is the paradigmatic case of computing machines, but there are others such as analogical, connectionist, quantum and diverse forms of unconventional computing, each based on a particular intuition of the phenomenon of computing. This variety can be captured in terms of system levels, re-interpreting and generalizing Newell’s hierarchy, which includes the knowledge level at the top and the symbol level immediately below it. In this re-interpretation the knowledge level consists of human knowledge and the symbol level is generalized into a new level that here is called The Mode of Computing. Mental processes performed by natural brains are often thought of informally as computing processes and that the brain is alike to computing machinery. However, if natural computing does exist it should be characterized on its own. A proposal to such an effect is that natural computing appeared when interpretations were first made by biological entities, so natural computing and interpreting are two aspects of the same phenomenon, or that consciousness and experience are the manifestations of computing/interpreting. By analogy with computing machinery, there must be a system level at the top of the neural circuitry and directly below the knowledge level that is named here The mode of Natural Computing. If it turns out that such putative object does not exist the proposition that the mind is a computing process should be dropped; but characterizing it would come with solving the hard problem of consciousness.

The terms “extended cognition” and the “extended mind” identify two strands of philosophical argument that are commonly subsumed under the general heading of active externalism. The present paper describes an integrated approach to understanding extended cognition and the extended mind—one that papers over the differences between these two, ostensibly distinct, forms of cognitive extension. As an added bonus, the paper describes how active externalism might be applied to the realm of non-cognitive phenomena, thereby yielding an expansion in the theoretical and empirical scope of the active externalist enterprise. Both these points of progress stem from what is called the dispositional hypothesis. According to the dispositional hypothesis, extended cognition occurs when the mechanisms responsible for the manifestation of dispositional properties include components that lie beyond the borders of the thing to which the dispositional properties are ascribed.

Empathy mechanism in communication is the cornerstone for effective and meaningful interaction. Establishing an empathy mechanism in conversation agent (CA) requires accurate recognition of users’ emotions to facilitate generates appropriate empathetic responses. Therefore, we proposed a Multimodal Emotion Recognition Model (MERM) to recognizes a user’s emotional state from multimodal data (audio, facial expressions, and conversation text) during conversation, and an Interactive Empathetic Conversation Model (IECM) to generate empathetic responses based on the MERM. Comparative and ablation study results indicated that the proposed models outperform existing methods in recognizing the user’s emotions and generating appropriate empathetic responses. We also conducted an experiment study, the results indicated that the CA significantly enhances the user’s emotional experience.

In recent years, damage caused by negative tweets has become a social problem. In this paper, we consider a method of suppressing negative tweets by using reinforcement learning. In particular, we consider the case where tweet writing is modeled as a multi-agent environment. Numerical experiments verify the effects of suppression using various reinforcement learning methods. We will also verify robustness to environmental changes. We compared the results of Profit Sharing (PS) and Q-learning (QL) as reinforcement learning methods to confirm the effectiveness of PS, and confirmed the behavior of the rationality theorem in a multi-agent environment. Furthermore, in experiments regarding the ability to follow environmental changes, it was confirmed that PS is more robust than QL. If machines can appropriately intervene and interact with posts made by humans, we can expect that negative tweets and even blow-ups can be suppressed automatically without the need for costly human eye monitoring.

Interactive software agents, such as chatbots, are progressively being used in the area of health and well-being. In such applications, where agents engage with users in interpersonal conversations for, e.g., coaching, comfort or behavior-change interventions, there is an increased need for understanding agents’ empathic capabilities. In the current state-of-the-art, there are no tools to do that. In order to understand empathic capabilities in interactive software agents, we need a precise notion of empathy. The literature discusses a variety of definitions of empathy, but there is no consensus of a formal definition. Based on a systematic literature review and a qualitative analysis of recent approaches to empathy in interactive agents for health and well-being, a formal definition—an ontology—of empathy is developed. We present the potential of the formal definition in a controlled user-study by applying it as a tool for assessing empathy in two state-of-the-art health and well-being chatbots; Replika and Wysa. Our findings suggest that our definition captures necessary conditions for assessing empathy in interactive agents, and how it can uncover and explain trends in changing perceptions of empathy over time. The definition, implemented in Web Ontology Language (OWL), may serve as an automated tool, enabling systems to recognize empathy in interactions—be it an interactive agent evaluating its own empathic performance or an intelligent system assessing the empathic capability of its interlocutors.

Computational modeling plays an increasingly important role in neuroscience, highlighting the philosophical question of how computational models explain. In the particular case of neural network models, concerns have been raised about their intelligibility, and how these models relate (if at all) to what is found in the brain. We claim that what makes a system intelligible is an understanding of the dependencies between its behavior and the factors that are responsible for that behavior. In biology, many of these dependencies are naturally “top-down”, as ethological imperatives interact with evolutionary and developmental constraints under natural selection to produce systems with capabilities and behaviors appropriate to their evolutionary needs. We describe how the optimization techniques used to construct neural network models capture some key aspects of these dependencies, and thus help explain why brain systems are as they are — because when a challenging ecologically-relevant goal is shared by a neural network and the brain, it places constraints on the possible mechanisms exhibited in both kinds of systems. The presence and strength of these constraints explain why some outcomes are more likely than others. By combining two familiar modes of explanation — one based on bottom-up mechanistic description (whose relation to neural network models we address in a companion paper) and the other based on top-down constraints, these models have the potential to illuminate brain function.

From early days, a key and controversial question inside the artificial intelligence community was whether Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is achievable. AGI is the ability of machines and computer programs to achieve human-level intelligence and do all tasks that a human being can. While there exist a number of systems in the literature claiming they realize AGI, several other researchers argue that it is impossible to achieve it.

In this paper, we take a different view to the problem. First, we discuss that in order to realize AGI, along with building intelligent machines and programs, an intelligent world should also be constructed which is on the one hand, an accurate approximation of our world and on the other hand, a significant part of reasoning of intelligent machines is already embedded in this world. Then we discuss that AGI is not a product or algorithm, rather it is a continuous process which will become more and more mature over time (like human civilization and wisdom). Then, we argue that pre-trained embeddings play a key role in building this intelligent world and as a result, realizing AGI. We discuss how pre-trained embeddings facilitate achieving several characteristics of human-level intelligence, such as embodiment, common sense knowledge, unconscious knowledge and continuality of learning, by machines.

Much attention has been paid to ways in which different categories of individual combine different modalities to communicate meanings to others. One major challenge that remains is to gain a deeper understanding of the cognitive processing responsible for the simultaneous deployment and integration of various different resources during multimodal communication. In response to this challenge, a Modular Cognition Framework analysis will be applied to the question of how people communicate using all the resources at their disposal. The discussion will include relevant features of this framework. Then research into similarities between humans and chimpanzee communication will be discussed followed by a comparison between verbal and non- verbal communication and a consideration of a distinct but similar approach. Emphasis will be placed on the role of meaning and on synergies between the conceptual system and the two systems responsible for linguistic structure.

Measuring emotions in a comprehensive and meaningful way has been a constant challenge for emotion researchers in behavioral sciences. There is much debate surrounding affect and emotion conveyed in artwork as these elements are subjective higher-level semantics that are difficult to measure objectively. This paper introduces the Visual Aesthetic Wheel of Emotion (VAWE), a domain-specific device for measuring visual aesthetic emotions, which was structurally inspired by the Geneva Emotion Wheel (GEW). The development of the emotion terms used in this device were based on an extensive literature review on emotions induced by visual art and music, as well as various assessment tools. A set of emotions representing different categories were compiled and a field study was conducted to select the most appropriate terms for the wheel. VAWE contains twenty emotion terms that reflect emotional responses to a perceived aesthetic emotion from artwork stimuli. GEW’s adaptation procedure and analysis was used to determine the placement of the terms around the wheel, including a self-reporting test was developed and implemented with sixty participants. The twenty aesthetic emotion terms are organized on a wheel-like format with points on the spokes of the wheel representing the intensity users feel, along with a neutral option in the center. The device differs from instruments that require respondents to rate their feelings on a list of emotions terms as it organizes the terms to be rated on a theoretically justified two-dimensional system of valence and arousal.